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PREFACE
The research effort represented by this report was funded
by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The objective of the research effort was to evaluate
feedback mechanisms for MCCRES . Hopefully, the reader will
judge that the objective has been satisfied. In our opinion
it has been exceeded due largely to the formal and informal





Purpose of the Study
The study was conducted at the direction of the
Readiness Branch Headquarters Marine Corps (Code POR)
.
The study was conducted by Major T. P. Finnerty, USMC,
Professor K. J. Euske and LtCol J. F. Mullane, Jr., USMC
of the Administrative Sciences Department at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The study was
used to answer the following research questions:
(1) After MCCRES , what information should be fed back
to the evaluated Unit Commander?
(2) In what form should the evaluation format be?
(3) What channel (s) should be used to provide the
feedback to the evaluated unit?
II
.
Methodology of the Study
The study was conducted during the period July-
September 19 83. The goal of the study was to provide
answers to the primary research questions as well as to
three secondary research questions which will be dis-
cussed later. Both published documents and interviews
were used to develop the answers to the research questions
The literature reviewed for purposes of this study in-
cluded research literature in the areas of management
control and evaluation and DoD documents. Interviews
were conducted with a total of 37 Marine Corps officers.
in
These officers ranged in rank" from Captain to Colonel.
Thirty-six of the officers had significant experience
with MCCRES . Through a detailed weighting system
emphasis was given to the responses of those officers
who held key billets during a MCCRES. The most heavily
weighted were those officers who had served as Battalion/
Squadron Commanders, Senior Evaluators and Division/Wing
MCCRES Officers. The results of the study provided the
data from which a comprehensive feedback model was de-
signed which incorporated answers to the three primary
research questions on feedback.
Ill . Answers to Primary Research Questions
The three primary research questions were:
(1) After MCCRES, what information should be fedback
to the evaluated unit commander?
(2) In what form should the evaluation be?
(3) What channel (s) should be used to provide the
feedback to the evaluated unit?
The overall goal of the MCCRES is not only to pro-
vide a measure of unit readiness, but to provide infor-
mation to the organization to improve readiness by
applying resources to areas identified as deficient by
MCCRES. It was evident throughout the study that the
unit commander faced many constraints: training, time,
material, equipment, logistics, and personnel. There-
fore the information from MCCRES should be provided in
IV
such a way as to allow for better allocation of these
scarce resources to the unit to improve readiness.
In both theoretical and applied models of evaluation,
information and feedback play an important role in both
performing and using the results of an evaluation. In
general all models of evaluation have common desirable
characteristics such as: brevity, clarity, timeliness,
interim products and reports, and responsiveness of
feedback. Therefore the MCCRES should also incorporate
these common characteristics of a good evaluation system.
Based upon literature review and the results of
the field study interviews, a model for MCCRES feedback
was developed. The model is presented at the end of the
summary. Each of the eight major elements of the model
that affect the evaluated unit are explained below.
1. Pre-MCCRES Briefing
A detailed orientation several weeks prior to MCCRE
to provide a firm foundation for all key personnel.
The orientation should provide a detailed explanation
of appropriate volumes of MCO 3501.2. Explanation of
the details of each MPS and procedures for the evaluator
allows the unit to maximize the potential from the
MCCRE feedback.
2 . Real-Time Feedback
Regular verbal feedback throughout the exercise by
evaluators at each level. At any logical break in the
v
scenario detailed evaluations of the most recent events
should be provided by the evaluators. This provides




The Evaluator Worksheets should be provided directly
to the evaluated element shortly after conclusion of the
exercise. This provides an interim evaluation report
and allows for maximum feed-back to the specific element
evaluated. Worksheets of the evaluators would be
especially valuable to subunits and attachments who
often receive only minimal feedback under current
procedures .
4 . Two-way Debrief
At the end of exercise, twelve to twenty-four hours
after the end of the formal MCCRES , a detailed debrief
should be held for evaluators and key players from the
unit evaluated. Opportunities should be given for two-
way discussion to resolve any confusion or disagreement
particularly regarding subjective areas. The individuals
from the evaluated unit should leave with not only a clear
understanding of the deficiencies but also with a clear
understanding of what caused the "No" evaluations and
suggestions for improvement. Since the commander of the
unit evaluated is responsible for the employment of the
feedback, he should have the flexibility to tailor the
debrief to his leadership style . The commander may de-
sire to have only a few selected evaluators and officers
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present or the unit commander may desire all evaluators
and unit officers to be present.
5. Computerized MCCRES Printout
—
The computerized MCCRES printout with percentile
scores and detailed amplifying remarks should be pro-
vided to the unit in a timely manner. It does a unit
little good to get the detailed results when there is no
time to correct deficiencies. What is timely? This can
vary depending on deployment schedules, but getting a
copy of the results in the hands of the evaluated unit
so that action can be taken is essential. It is inex-
cusable and unprofessional to allow staffing to delay
this critical information . Delays also put the unit
further away from the MCCRES and final written results





The data needed to compare units within a division or
wing is currently available with limited research within
the division or wing files. Additionally most division
or wing headquarters are well aware of how their internal
unit scores compare with other like units. Usage of the
general MCCRES data bank to provide comparative scores,
medians, and standard deviations should be provided to
major headquarters staff, training, and doctrine commands
for the limited purpose of planning future resource
vn
allocation and to develop training doctrine. These com-
parative results should be limited to Section/MPS/Task
scores and should not include any sort of comparative
final score for the individual units tested . Eecause
of the many variations in evaluation conditions that
exist, providing any sort of overall scores that could
be used to compare individual units tested could well be
misleading and have a negative impact. It is further
recommended that these comparative results be directed
only at division/wing level or higher commands to reduce
the chance of any type of Battalion/Squadron unit
comparisons
.
An example of comparative percentile results that
could be provided to division/wing level for use in
planning future training is presented in -Figure 1.




Section 2.0 Operations Performed
MPS 2. A Actions by Marines
Task 2.A.1 Discipline
Figure 1. Sample of Comparative Summary Percentile
Results
7 . Follow-up Report
Currently no follow-up evaluation is made to confirm





of final check is needed. This check would best be
accomplished with little formality. Since the unit com-
mander has the responsibility for application of MCCRES
feedback to improve unit readiness, it is best left to
the unit commander to do the final check which certifies
that deficiencies have been corrected. Resource reallo-
cation from outside the evaluated unit likewise should
be certified at the appropriate level . The key issue
here is that the unit must be deployed at the highest
level of combat readiness and verification of correction
of MCCRES deficiencies at least on an informal basis is
essential. This follow-up should be made as simply as
possible. The unit commander can appropriately perform
this certification based on his own experience and judg-
ment . A formal follow-up inspection is neither necessary
nor desirable .
8 . Trend Analysis
To gain a higher level of across-the-board readiness,
a trend analysis would be of value to all units. The
MCCRES data base represents a resource that could be
used to keep the Marine Corps informed of its overall
strengths and weaknesses. Special emphasis should be
made on getting these results to training and doctrine
organizations throughout the Marine Corps.
IV. Answers to Secondary Research Questions
The study also provided answers to secondary research
questions. The three secondary research questions were:
ix
(1) What is the validity of comparing MCCRES results
given under differing conditions?
(2) Does MCCRES contribute to effective training?
(3) Is there the available time and follow-up to
ensure correction of deficiencies identified
during MCCRES?
A first response to the question of the validity of com-
paring MCCRES results given under differing conditions
might be to say that such comparisons can only be made
if complete standardization is achieved. Although com-
plete standardization for purposes of evaluation may
seem to be desirable, this is not feasible. Since various
Marine Corps units (east coast, west coast, overseas)
prepare for different missions, it is desirable to simu-
late their expected combat employment through the use of
different scenarios, terrain, and MPS's. Additionally
the Marine Corps has other exercises, such as the Com-
bined Arms Exercise (CAX's) , which are used to evaluate
under standard scenario, terrain, and evaluators, but
they have a more limited purpose than MCCRES. Addition-
ally, because of the broader purposes of MCCRES, complete
standardization is probably not desirable. For its in-
tended purpose, MCCRES provides a relatively high degree
of objectivity when compared with some other evaluation
systems, such as the performance evaluation system used
for the promotion of Marine officers, and the results
are likely to be useful, at least for generic comparisons
and for identifying trends.
In response to the question of MCCRES * s contribution
to effective training, it is evident from the study data
that MCCRES has the potential to, and currently does,
improve unit training in preparing for a MCCRES. Many
units train to MCCRES standards and go so far as to use
actual MCCRES Section/MPS/Task/Requirements to structure
their unit training. Therefore as the Individual Train-
ing Standards (ITS) are developed for all units, it is
essential that the training and evaluation development
move in the same direction.
The third question concerns time availability to
correct MCCRES deficiencies. A comment often brought up
during the study was that insufficient time to correct
operational deficiencies exists between the time a MCCRES
was taken and the time of deployment. This is a criti-
cal factor after a MCCRES. It does little good to simply
identify deficiencies of a unit. A set aside period of
time must be provided in training schedules and used for
remedial training in areas identified as weak. The time
needed must be judged on a case by case basis and correc-
tive training applied accordingly. The researchers were
often told during the study that MCCRES is just one more
hurdle to be jumped on the road to deployment and that
once it is past the unit seldom looks back to correct
operational deficiencies. No doubt more time would allow
for more training in deficient areas. However, the
XI
question of follow-up is also critical. As stated above
at least an informal re-validation of deficient areas
is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the MCCRES
.
The study provided detailed answers to the questions
posed. The feedback to the unit is the key element to
making the MCCRES of value to the unit evaluated. The
purpose of MCCRES is to provide timely and accurate
evaluation of the force readiness. Key to improving
readiness is identification of strengths and weaknesses,
and providing timely and thorough feedback to the evaluate
unit and its chain of command. The more timely and
thorough the feedback, the higher the likelihood of im-
proved future readiness. The MCCRES is currently viewed
as a sound, valuable evaluation system by those who have
been involved in it. However, as this study has demon-
strated, the feedback to units can and should be improved.
V. Study Recommendations
The feedback model developed and displayed at the
end of the summary should be incorporated as the minimum
acceptable procedure for providing feedback from any
MCCRES. To accomplish this, the eight steps in the
feedback model should be followed during each evaluation.
The following information should be routinely provided
as feedback:
Pre-MCCRES briefing—to key MCCRES players from
the evaluated unit
Real Time Feedback— distributed to all those evaluate<
xn
Two-way Debrief at end of exercise—tailored to
needs of the evaluated unit commander to




timely manner to allow new resource allocation
prior to deployment
Comparative Percentile Results— to help direct
unit training and for incorporation by indi-
vidual training and doctrine commands
Follow-up Report—done informally by the unit
commander to ensure closure of the feedback
loop by the correction of identified deficiencies
Trend Analysis— to support future training as well
as changes in doctrine.
Implementation of these recommendations would suit
the stated needs of fleet units as well as serve the
intended purpose of MCCRES of providing an evaluation
of unit readiness to higher headquarters.
VI . Summary
The purpose of the study was to determine the most
appropriate and effective manner in which to provide
feedback to the unit commander from a MCCRES. To this
end research was conducted into the area of existing
systems which measure or evaluate readiness.
The study was approached from a multi-disciplinary
background with a detailed emphasis on the economic
question of how better distribution could be made of
the scarce resources of manpower, equipment, and training
time based on the results of MCCRES. To answer the ques-
tions a detailed field study was conducted in which
interviews were completed with 37 Marine officers of
Xlll
rank from Captain to Colonel who have had involvement
with MCCRES as key billet holders. Additionally, re-
search literature in the areas of management control
and evaluation of much of the original documentation
that laid the groundwork for the development of MCCRES
was reviewed along with interviews with some of the
original developers of the system.
The results of the study are displayed as an eight
step feedback model which is based on previous research
in the fields of management control and evaluation, as
well as the results of the field study. These results
are communicated to the reader as a model presented at
the end of the summay which is comprised of the follow-
ing elements:
(1) Pre-MCCRES Briefing
(2) Real Time Feedback
(3) Evaluator Worksheets
(4) Two-way Debrief at the end of Exercise
(5) Computerized MCCRES Printout
(6) Comparative Percentile Results
(7) Follow-up Report
(8) Trend Analysis
The incorporation of this model as standard MCCRES
feedback procedure will significantly enhance the value
of the results to the evaluated unit and will improve
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The Military has long recognized the need for forces to
be prepared for combat. The United States Marine Corps has
historically been considered this country's force in readi-
ness. A means to evaluate and measure readiness, called the
Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) , was
implemented by the Service in 19 77. MCCRES was designed to
provide readiness information to all levels of command. How-
ever, the system's ultimate value lies in the communication of
information to the unit evaluated and to the higher level com-
mands that can support improved allocation of resources and,
ultimately, a higher level of readiness. This research views
the MCCRES from an interdisciplinary perspective and specifically
looks at the economic consideration of improving the allocation
of scarce resources of manpower, equipment and training time.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to look specifically at the
feedback resulting from a MCCRES evaluation and to consider
all of the MCCRES information available to the Marine Corps
and to determine how that information could be used to improve
combat readiness
.
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Initially a detailed literature search was conducted into
the areas of management control and evaluation. Following
the detailed literature search, the background and develop-
ment of MCCRES was reviewed. The MCCRES is applied through-
out the Marine Corps to evaluate ground and air combat, as
well as combat service support units. Most commonly the
MCCRES is applied at the infantry battalion and aviation
squadron level. In total over 500 MCCRES' s have been conduc-
ted since implementation in 1977. Therefore, a sizeable body
of Marine Corps Officers still on active duty have served in
key billets during MCCRES evaluations. To capitalize upon
their experience, a field study was conducted which included
interviews with the initial developers of MCCRES (both Marine
and civilian personnel) . In addition key questions on MCCRES
feedback were posed to those who had been involved at all
levels of MCCRES but with special emphasis on those who had
served as unit commanders, senior evaluators , or division or
squadron MCCRES officers. Based on this research the answers
to questions posed by this study were answered.
C. ANALYSIS
The information obtained was subjected to two levels of
analysis. First specific responses to the field study were
analyzed through content analysis. Next an analysis of
general responses to the data collected was conducted iden-
tifying MCCRES elements which were repeatedly presented by
those interviewed. Finally, a summary of unsolicited comments
were compiled to provide completeness to the study and are
suggested as areas for further research.
D. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The results and conclusions are provided in the form of







5 Computerized MCCRES Printout
6. Comparative Percentile Results
7. Follow-up Report
8. Trend Analysis
Overall the MCCRES is viewed as a valuable and necessary
measure of unit readiness. However, to maximize the effec-
tiveness of MCCRES, timely distribution of results must be made
to the unit evaluated and all others directly in the chain of
command. The timely distribution of results will allow for
improved resource allocation. Specifically, the distribution
of results has a high value for improving the use of limited
training time and the development of doctrine that supports
the effective and efficient use of Marine Corps resources.
Thus, regular distribution of generic results should be pro-
vided to all training and doctrine commands throughout the
Marine Corps to improve areas consistently identified as
deficient.
II. BACKGROUND
The Marine Corps is interested in assessing Unit Combat
Readiness. Readiness is generally viewed as the peacetime
level of preparedness to go into combat. The Marine Corps
Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) is designed to
measure units ' level of readiness through simulated combat
conditions as determined by specific criteria set forth in the
form of mission performance standards, tasks and requirements,
and as judged by experienced, expert evaluators [Ref . 1]
.
The readiness demonstrated is actually a complex set of re-
sults based on the effective allocation of resources by the
service and the unit commander [Ref. 1] . Management control
encompasses all management actions taken by the service and
the unit's commander to bring the unit to peak efficiency.
The evaluation system employed is a detailed effort to quan-
titatively determine the success of that resource allocation.
This chapter explores the key concept of readiness as it has
historically evolved. It discusses the basics of MCCRES and
lays groundwork for the detailed research that is directed at
answering key questions involving feedback of MCCRES data to
the unit commander for the specific purpose of upgrading
deficiencies
.
A. MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION SYSTEM (MCCRES)
Historically the Marine Corps has been called upon as a
ready force to meet contingencies on short notice world-wide.
The specific Marine Corps Missions are detailed in the National
Security Act of 194 7. The unique air-ground combat team organi-
zation in which each unit ranging in size from the Marine
Amphibious Unit (MAU) to Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is task
organized with Marine Corps Air, Ground, Combat Support, and
Combat Service Support elements making the organization uniquely
suited to respond rapidly to U.S. global needs. Recent inci-
dents such as the 1979 Iranian Crisis and the 19 82 Lebanese
Crisis have placed current emphasis on this historic role.
1 . Purpose
The operational capabilities of combat units describe
their abilities to function for their intended purpose. It
is, therefore, necessary that some means be used to estimate
their ability to perform their intended mission short of actual
combat. In 19 76 the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
identified the need to develop an operational readiness
evaluation program. In his Posture Statement to Congress
for 19 78, General Louis H. Wilson, Commandant of the Marine
Corps, made the following statement describing a need
for:
...an improved readiness evaluation system to, provide
a timely and accurate evaluation of the readiness of the
Fleet Marine Forces, including reserve units, to accom-
plish assigned missions. [Ref . 1: p. I-A-l]
The Marine Corps began using the system in July, 1978. Since
that time the system has been used to test all Marine Corps
Infantry Units, Fixed Wing Squadrons, Rotary Wing and Obser-
vation Squadrons, Combat Support and Combat Service Support
elements, both regular and reserve, ~at least once every 24
months. In his FY-84 Posture Statement to Congress, General
Robert H. Barrow (then Commandant of the Marine Corps) made
the following comment about MCCRES
.
A key element in the readiness equation continues to
be operational performance standards. Even before
these units deploy, we evaluate their capabilities
to accomplish their assigned missions through the
rigorous Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation
System. The System objectively evaluates the combat
readiness of all active and reserve FMF (Fleet Marine
Force) Units. [Ref. 2: p. 47]
The goal of MCCRES is to test the combat readiness of
Marine Corps units. These tests have been developed to evalu-
ate the five types of units mentioned previously. There are
difficulties in applying a standard such as MCCRES. The real
question that needs to be answered for the organization is:
"Can the unit do the job?" [Ref. 3: p. 1] . Since the real
answer can only be obtained under actual combat conditions,
the Marine Corps must substitute simulated combat for actual
combat. Thus the question that is answered is: "How close
is the execution to doctrine? [Ref. 3: p. 1] . Thus for MCCRES,
the Marine Corps tests adherence to doctrine, under simulated
combat conditions as a proxy for the real question.
2 . Scoring/Results
The guidance for MCCRES is defined in detail by Marine
Corps Order (MCO) 3501.2, Volumes I-X. This provides details
on how the MCCRES is applied to each type of unit. The
evaluation is broken down into ten (10) categories that are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
1. Reporting to higher level of command
2. Preparing for operations
3. Communicating (including communications SOP)
4. Performing as Marines (e.g. discipline, dispersion,
camouflage, concealment, using weapons)




7. Conforming to doctrine
8. Executing operations
9. Providing combat service support (including medical
support)
10. Supervising required actions by individual Marines.
Each category corresponds to a vital aspect of the unit's
performance [Ref. 3]
.
For an Infantry Battalion the evaluation is divided
into 19 Mission Performance Standards, 14 5 Tasks, and 79 3 Re-
quirements. Each Battalion is not tested on all MPS, Tasks,
and Requirements [Refs. 1, 4 J . The final result is a "Combat
Ready/Not Combat Ready" for the unit evaluated based on the
overall judgment of the senior evaluator. Results are also
provided as percentile scores for the Section, MPS, and Tasks
The format for information provided is as follows:
Infantry Unit
Operations Performed % Score
Actions by Marines % Score
Discipline % Score
Self Discipline % Score*
*Note: Only a yes/no is given for a Requirement, thus





Requirement 2. A. 1.1
For example, the Infantry Evaluation is subdivided
into four Sections: Section 2. A identifies standards applica-
ble to all evaluations. It is divided into three MPS, the
first of which is Action by Marines. 'Actions by Marines' is
subdivided into 13 Tasks— the first, 'Tasks, Discipline' is
subdivided into nine Requirements. The first of these re-
quirements is 'Self-Discipline.' Requirements are evaluated
as: Yes/No/Not Applicable. Section, MPS, Tasks, and Require-
ments' overall evaluations are each given a weighted percentile
score based on the number of Yes's for Requirements under the
respective category.
3. Procedure
The MCCRES is divided for simplicity into five phases.
Phase Cne requires determining the appropriate MPS to be
evaluated based on Marine Corps Order 3501.2, Vol. I, and the
appropriate volume that applies to the unit being evaluated
—
for instance, air or combat-service support. Phase Two con-
sists of briefing evaluators [Refs . 5,6J. Phase Three is the
actual evaluation under simulated combat. During this phase
the evaluators actually make the Yes/No evaluations of the
requirements. They are guided by detailed Key Indicators
(KI) which assist the evaluator in making the appropriate
choice [Ref. 4J . Phase Four consists of compiling the evalua-
tion results and determining the percentile scores as well as
the "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready" determination by the
senior evaluator.
Officially, there is no relationship between the numeri-
cal score for the Battalion and the Combat Ready/Not
8
Combat Ready rating. It is possible, for example, that
one battalion with an overall numerical score of 50
could be judged Combat Ready, while another having a
numerical score of 75 could be judged Not Combat Ready.
[Ref. 7: p. 40]
Phase Five, the final phase, is the debrief of the evaluated
unit by the evaluators as well as the detailed written report
(computer printout) which is provided to the evaluated unit.
Other reports are forwarded to Headquarters Marine Corps
(CMC) —an initial message report within 10 days and the
detailed report within 30 working days [Ref. 1],
B . READINESS
At the center of any Readiness Evaluation System is under-
standing what is meant by the key concept of "readiness."
The inherent difficulty in describing this term makes any
evaluation, measure, or model of readiness all the more
complex. Thus we must explore the meaning of "readiness."
1 . Definition
Usage of the term "readiness" has tended to change
even at the highest levels within the Department of Defense
(DoD) . In FY 1977, then Secretary of Defense, Donald H.
Rumsfeld, used the following definition of readiness:
"Readiness" is a concept that integrates the diverse
factors that affect the ability to deploy, engage, and
sustain effective combat forces. It starts with the
overall ability and proficiency of U.S. fighting men...
An equally important determinant of overall readiness
is the availability, capability, and condition of the
force's fighting equipment. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
In FY 19 7 8 the same Secretary of Defense is quoted
as follows:
"Readiness" refers to the capability to respond adequately
to diverse situations and to sustain that response as
long as necessary. The "Readiness" of Defense Combat
Forces depends on a myriad of diverse and often inter-
related factors. [Ref. 8: p. 2]
Under the current administration the concept has taken
a more standardized definition. In an address to Congress on
February 8, 1982, and January 31, 1983, Secretary of
Defense Weinberger used the following definition:
Readiness is the ability of forces, units, weapons
systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which
they were designed (including the ability to deploy
and employ without unacceptable delays) . It depends on
having the required quantities of equipment in the hands
of the units on a day-to-day basis and on having the
required number of adequately trained people assigned
with the necessary mix of grades and experience level
and to ensure that people and machines can work to-
gether. [Ref. 9: p. 1-28]
This definition includes training (individual and unit),
material, equipment, logistics, and personnel all as part
of the readiness definition.
For the purpose of continuity and brevity, the follow-
ing definition of readiness is used on a day-to-day basis by
the Marine Corps and is the accepted definition from JCS
,
Publication 6, used for the DoD Unit Reporting System
(UNITREP)
.
Readiness: ability of forces, units, weapons systems,
or equipments to deliver outputs for which they were
designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ
without unacceptable delays) . [Ref. 10: p. 1]
It is further amplified as follows:
Readiness is essentially a measure of pre-D-Day status
(extending at most into initial combat operations) while
sustainability is a Post-D-Day measure. Hence, we
often speak of peace time readiness , but combat
sustainability . [Ref. 10: p. 1]
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For consistency this definition of readiness, as amplified,
is used throughout this study, since it provides the cur-
rently accepted DoD definition. In the literature the terms
'effectiveness' and ' sustainability ' are often interchanged
to indicate Post-D-Day combat capabilities. Because of its
broader implications the term effectiveness is used herein
to mean Post-D-Day status. Hereafter we refer to Pre-Combat




The difficulty in defining readiness may be exceeded
only by the difficulty of measuring it. Many attempts have
been made to index readiness, but to date none have been suc-
cessful or achieved wide acceptance. As described by Barzily,
Mar low, and Zacks, in their "Survey of Approaches to Readi-
ness," the motivating factor common to all attempts is to
measure the effects of budgetary changes on readiness. They
reviewed a number of readiness indexes, such as the U.S.
Navy METRI Project, MARIS Project, MAXCAP Models, and others
and found that:
The readiness indexes posed do not attain the desired
objective. They are usually very insensitive to changes
that occur at the lower echelons and, furthermore, they
are generallv improper indexes of readiness. [Ref. 11:
p. 25]
3 Economic Question
The readiness as described in both Definitions and
Indexing sections has strong economic overtones. The approach
in this study is to treat readiness as an economic question
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(i.e., the allocation of scarce resources of training time,
material, equipment, logistics, and personnel as inputs with
the desired results of maximizing outputs) . The true output
of a combat organization is effectiveness in combat. There
is obvious difficulty in measuring that output. Because of
this difficulty proxy measures, such as number of aircraft
or number of ships, are generally used. The difficulty of
measuring output was recently stated in a study by
Rand for the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Manpower, Reserve
Affairs, and Logistics:
The output of an Army Maneuver/Firepower Unit is
especially difficult because such units have no single
output or product that can be directly related to
their mission. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
In a recent study by Steven L. Funk, several observa-
tions were 'made which have application here. He states that
although peacetime Army readiness is an honored theme, it is
not always practical. This is a result of preparedness not
being the actual primary peacetime mission, but just one of
several competing missions that take resources of manpower,
equipment, and training time. Funk cites major factors that
detract from the unit being able to train for combat situations:
(1) Lack of resources to accomplish requirements
(i.e., skilled personnel, time, ammunition,
repair parts, and facilities),
(2) changing and competing priorities that fragment
resources and negate planning, and
(3) a climate that deprives unit leadership of
decision "maneuver space" and fragments their
attention (i.e., centralized decision making/
control, burdensome administration, low unit
cohesion and ambiguous institutional values)
.
[Ref. 13: p. 6]
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Although the previous study "was made of the U.S.
Army, many of the detractors apply equally to the Marine
Corps. Some policies such as Unit Rotation (i.e., the policy
of maintaining unit integrity by replacing an entire battalion/
squadron rather than replacing individuals) and Deployment-
Lock-On periods (i.e., the policy of assigning resources to
a unit well in advance of a planned deployment and then main-
taining and replacing those resources through the training
cycle and into deployment) have lessened the negative effects.
However, in the Marine Corps the problem of competing priori-
ties will always exist. The unit commander is constrained by
many elements beyond his control [Ref . 12J . Thus the question
of unit readiness is certainly one of economic priorities or
competing priorities. Readiness to a large degree depends on
the effective resource allocation both to the unit and within
the unit.
C. MCCRES AS THE EVALUATION SYSTEM
1. Research
The evaluation system employed by the Marine Corps
has undergone much study from the standpoint of developing an
objective versus a subjective system of evaluation. Much of
the statistical work for this has been done by the George
Washington School of Engineering and Applied Science [Refs.
3, 4]. Additionally, the questions of evaluator selection bias
were analyzed in other research that supported this study
[Refs. 5, 6].
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As a result of the George Washington University
studies, it was determined MCCRES had the following merits:
a. Most requirements are requests for descriptive data
and not for judgments. Judgments were previously
made by defining the requirements and assigning
weights
.
b. The details of the doctrine are given and interpreted
in the requirements, thus avoiding the possibility
of being misinterpreted or forgotten by the
evaluators
.
c. The execution of most requirements consumes short
time periods and thus the evaluators ' memories are
not overburdened.
d. Assigning a score of a YES or NO is easier than
assigning scores on any other scale.
e. The set of the requirements exhausts the details
of the executions. [Ref. 3: p. 25]
Though the George Washington University research identifies
merits of MCCRES, it does not address the question of what
feedback should be provided to the evaluated unit.
2 . Feedback
The purpose of this research was to determine the
types of feedback that are most useful and valuable to an
evaluated unit. Feedback is a necessary part of any control
or evaluation system. In December, 1981, B. General A. A.
Sordo, then Director of the Marine Corps Training Division,
made the following comment:
The evaluation and feedback process in training is
one where we need to do substantial work. MCCRES
helps us greatly. In the future, as we link the
individual training standards of our ITS System to
MCCRES Mission Performance Standards, we'll be able
to do better! But above and beyond that, our
measurements of adequacy and effectiveness are for
the most part decentralized and highly subjective
and impressionistic. In the long run we rely on
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our assessment of the unit or organizational capabili-
ties as the best gauge of adequacy in training
preparation. [Ref. 14: p. 54]
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As a result of the need to define specifically the feed-
back and information needed by evaluated units as the result
of MCCRES , this study was undertaken. The following questions
form the basis for this study:
1. Primary
a. After a MCCRES, what information should be fed
back to the evaluated unit commander?
b. In what form should the evaluation feedback be?
c. What channel (s) should be used to provide the




In addition to the specific questions above, there are
several subsidiary questions which arise as a logical conse-
quence of the primary questions. They involve the following
topics: (1) validity of comparing MCCRES results given under
differing conditions, (2) MCCRES contribution to effective
training, and (3) time availability and followup to ensure
correction of deficiencies identified during the MCCRES.
To properly answer the questions posed, the authors
took a multi-disciplinary approach. The management control
and evaluation literature can provide a great deal of insight
toward understanding the complexities of the information
needs. Thus the literature of the two fields is exDlored in
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detail in the next chapter. In addition much work has been
done in the area of modeling effectiveness. This has been
done from the perspective of applied, conceptual, statistical
and economic models. Since these provide rich theories for
the understanding of the measurement and indexing of effec-
tiveness, these concepts are explored.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter was designed to provide a history of MCCRES
,
explain the need for such a system from the Marine Corps
perspective, give a basic description of the system, and
provide a detailed understanding of the inherent difficulties
of efforts to evaluate the concept of readiness.
Readiness is approached from the standpoint of economics
—
the application of scarce resources (inputs) of time, men,
materials to the process of simulated combat. The unit com-
mander controls the organization with a highly sophisticated
management control system in accordance with the external and
internal objectives and policies. MCCRES is a unit evaluation
system which evaluates the management control process of that
organization. The primary questions are then presented as
the basis of this research. The following chapters briefly
explore the management control systems and evaluation
literature with specific emphasis on feedback mechanisms.
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III. MANAGEMENT, MANAGEMENT CONTROL, EVALUATION,
AND FEEDBACK
The topics to be covered in this chapter are as follows:
first the topic of management is described in a general
context; management control and its implications for feedback
are explored; then, a series of selected evaluation theories
are presented in detail. Finally a series of evaluation
models with application to the military are provided. Empha-
sis in these models is on feedback. A summary of feedback
as developed in the models is presented.
A. MANAGEMENT
Management is described as: (1) "art or act of managing;
conduct; control; direction. (2) Judicious use of means to
accomplish an end; skillful treatment" [Ref. 15]. Webber
describes it in many contexts—experience , training, practice,
theory, art, and science [Ref. 16]. The simplest definition
and one often heard is the art of getting things done through
people. The elements, however, that all descriptions of
management have in common are that managers engage in two
important activities: planning and control [Ref. 17]. It
is important to make the distinction clearly between the terms
management and leadership. The military has long recognized
that the term "leader" has much broader implications than
that of manager. The unit is more than the sum of its parts;
and, therefore, the military commander's responsibility is
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not only for the technical and tactical proficiency of the
unit, but for the overall cohesive functioning of the organi-
zation [Ref . 18] . In this context it is appropriate to say
that management skills are a necessary subset of leadership
and that the good leader is necessarily a good manager, how-
ever, the converse of that statement is not necessarily true.
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL
Robert Anthony placed management control in a hierarchi-
cal framework with Strategic Planning above and Operational
Control below Management Control. He described this classi-
fication for any large organization where these functions are
present.
Strategic planning is the highest level of management
where the long range objectives, policies, and plans of the
organization are made.
Strategic planning is the process of deciding on
objectives of the organization, on changes in the
objectives, on resources used to attain these
objectives, and on the policies that are to govern
the acquisition, use, and disposition of these
resources. [Ref. 19: p. 16]
The management control level involves middle management,
and the timeframe is shorter, about 12 months.
Management control is the process by which managers
assure that resources are obtained and used effec-
tively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the
organization's objectives. [Ref. 19: p. 17]
The lowest level of control is operational where the day-
to-day functioning of the organization is accomplished. The
implementation of plans and policies are executed at this level
18
Lebas describes management control as an enlarged feedback
loop which affects human behavior and performance [Ref. 20].
Hofstede also provides a useful definition of management con-
trol "...as a pragmatic concern for results, obtained
through people" [Ref. 21: p. 193].
Given the purpose of this study is to identify feedback
needed for improved resource allocation, it is important to
focus on the terms "effectiveness" and "efficiency", which
are present in many of the definitions of management control.
In this context the terms effectiveness and efficiency are
defined as follows:
Effectiveness .. .relates to the accomplishment of the
cooperative purpose. . .when a specific desired end is
attained we shall say that the action is effective.
[Ref. 19: p. 27]
Ef ficiency . . .refers to the engineering sense of...
the optimum relationship between given inputs and
outputs. [Ref. 19: p. 27]
Lebas identifies the three major schools of thought
on management control: organizational process approach,
information economics approach and behavioral approach.
1. Organizational Process Approach
The Organizational Process Approach is that taken
by Anthony. He divides the feedback loop into three distinct
parts, described previously as strategic planning and manage-
ment control and operational control. This approach reduces
the human motivational problem to what Anthony calls "gcal
congruence" or the various ways in which the manager can be
encouraged to take actions which are in the best interest of
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the company. Achieving effective and efficient use of re-
sources is accomplished through procedures within the
organization such as performance evaluation, reporting, and





The Information Economics Approach is more abstract.
It proposes that only models based on expected utility maxi-
mization need to be considered. A set of subjective probabili-
ties are assumed to be known by the decision-maker and that
the decision-maker will always act to maximize utility. In
this approach, good performance is described as the action
which minimizes the end result differences between the expected
outcomes and the actual outcomes. The emphasis, however, is
on the decision model not the outcome. A further aspect of
the theory is its emphasis on maximizing the expected utility.
This leads to the conclusion that the control process is a
prior phenomenon that suggests management spend more time
preparing decisions than evaluating outcomes [Ref. 20].
The major limitation to the Information Economics
Approach is that it is all based on the Savage-Rational Man
Model and that an effort will be made to maximize utility in
every case. Although an interesting theoretical model, it
relies heavily on the calculus of maximizing utility in each
and every case [Ref. 20]
.
3 Behavioral Approach
This is actually a loosely structured set of ap-
proaches to the concept of management control taking ideas
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from many theories. Two descriptive ideas that it entails
from Herbert Simon are:
Satisf icing ... interrupting the action selection process
as soon as the first acceptable action has been found.
And
Bounded Reality. . .the notion that man is a piecewise
rational. [Ref. 20]
Other ideas presented by Ouchi and referred to by
Lebas have shown that:
...rigorous output control is the most effective way
to induce good performance in managers. [Ref. 20]
Lebas views the real value of behavioral approaches
in their diversity and being based on observations of people
in real situations. The limitations come from their multi-
plicity and that creates difficulty in setting any sort of
coherent guidelines for a manager to employ [Ref. 20].
4 . Integrated Approach
The previous broad structures of management control
system have been integrated by Ansari in what he refers to
as an operational systems concept [Ref. 22]. He views the
previous perspectives on management control systems in two
versus three broad categories. Grouping the structural view




Ansari describes the structural view of management
control as that adopted by researchers in cybernetics, account-
ing, and management information systems— those that concentrate
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primarily on the information and communications aspects of
control systems. The behavioral approaches are identified
as those that are based primarily on human behavior in organi-
zations and regard control as a problem of encouraging sub-
ordinates to achieve performance goals. In this context he
uses control systems to describe:
...those arrangements and actions designated to
facilitate its members to achieve higher performance
with least unintended consequences. [Ref. 22: p. 102]
b. Elements of Management Control Systems
There is agreement among most authors reviewed
from both the structural and behavioral schools that all
management control systems consist of two elements. The
first being "an information network which prescribes the
rules for measurement, collection, processing, and transmission
of information" [Ref. 22: p. 102]. This element causes the
information on performance, goals, outputs, and exceptions
from plans to be transmitted to managers. The second ele-
ment is the set of social relationships through which the
control system achieves the organizational goals [Ref. 22J
.
c. Joint Consideration
Ansari argues that management control is actually
best approached from a combination of the structural and be-
havioral ideas. He declares that the current phase of design
is more situational and that it focuses on the more important
issue of improving performance instead of the narrow con-
cept of constraining behavior. The information that is pro-
vided passes through two phases. First, it must be perceived
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before it can be used and second not only managers, but
subordinates, must also use information for self-evaluation
and guidance of performance. He further identifies five con-
siderations which are characteristic of all information
structures.
1. Nature of Measures— the subordinates' motivation
is affected by the completeness, objectivity,
and influence of the characteristics of perform-
ance measures.
2. Source and Order of Presentation—The source of
the information must be credible and the order
of presentation can change the perceptions of
the information.
3. Timing—Both the speed and frequency are impor-
tant, too long an interval may cause the user
to lose interest or be distracted.
4. Route--The route may alter the information and
thus the sender and receiver may not be sharing
the same information.
5. Shared Information—The others with whom the
information is shared thus may affect the
recipient's view of the information with regard
to fairness and accuracy. [Ref. 22]
All of these considerations must be made by the
designer in any information, evaluation system. To summarize
the characteristics of the integrated model, this takes into
account both the structure of the organization and its infor-
mational systems as well as the social side considering
subordinate personality and leadership style. The designer
of a management control system should combine components
(such as an evaluation system) in such a way as to minimize
cognitive conflicts and encourage behavior which resolves
conflict with positive results for the organization. It
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should also be kept in mind that if rewards for performance
are too highly contingent on outputs of the information struc-
ture, the greater the chance that there will be controversy
over the output [Ref . 22] . A good example of this contro-
versy is discussed by Anthony Hopwood in the way in which
accounting data was used in the performance evaluation of
managers
.
Based upon a study he conducted, Hopwood identi-
fied four ways in which accounting data was used in evaluation.
(1) Budget Constrained Style—required to meet a budget
but not concerned about costs.
(2) Budget Profit Style— concerned with both meeting a
budget and with costs.
(3) Profit Conscious Style--concerned with costs but not
with meeting a budget.
(4) Non-Accounting Style—not concerned with meeting a
budget or with costs. [Ref. 23]
He concluded that based on management style, many dysfunc-
tional behaviors may occur as the result of emphasis on
accounting data results in evaluations [Ref. 23].
5 . Other Thoughts on Management Control
Management control contains many rich conepts which
play a great part in the theory of evaluations . San Miguel
has made several interesting observations on management
control:
The end is a system that enables managers to make sound
decisions as to the efficient and effective allocation
of human, physical, and financial resources to attain
the objectives of the organization. [Ref. 24: p. 177]
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San Miguel further characterizes management science's
attempts to deal with modeling of complex control systems.
He characterizes the quantitative and economic decision tools'
attempt to simplify the decision making in large scale organi-
zations as falling short of their objectives
—
primarily be-
cause of the lack of knowledge of human behavior and the
ability to quantify it. He further cites measurement and
communications to be at the center of control systems, internal
planning, and reporting. There is general agreement in the
management control literature that measurement and communica-
tions systems have an important impact on the behavior of
individuals in organizations, their motivations and, thus,
their performance. Therefore, the areas of measurement and
evaluation are legitimate concerns for the design of any
management control system [Ref. 24]
.
6 . Summary
The intent in this section was to set the stage
through the discussion of the broader topics, management and
mangement control, for what is to be developed in the next
section on evaluation. Management control is a complex topic
which encompasses the broad aspects of all the control sys-
tems imposed on the organization through strategic plans and
policies as well as those developed within to assist managers
in internal control.
C. EVALUATION OVERVIEW
Evaluation models directed at readiness all embody a
common goal. Each in its own particular way attempts to
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identify a definitive measure or some particular relative
measure of the unit's Pre-D-Day preparedness for combat.
Preparedness may be viewed as readiness which acts as a proxy
measure for the military unit's ability to perform in combat.
Similar efforts are made to evaluate the ability to perform
in civilian organizations. In its simplest form, output is
measured by production level or quantity produced by a produc-
tion facility in a given time period. Various attempts are
also made to measure profitability of the firm. Microeconomic
theory assumes that each firm is attempting to maximize profit
[Ref. 25]. Therefore, some measure(s) are applied to the
fiscal results of each period to determine the financial
performance of the organization during the period [Ref. 25].
Similarly it can be assumed that each unit tries to maximize
its readiness. This section reviews efforts that have been
made to evaluate, measure, and model performance both in
theory and practice.
1. Evaluation Defined
The term evaluation is defined differently by various
authors; however, Stufflebeam et al. brings together three




Evaluation is identical to measurement. It
builds on attempts to measure psychological attributes or
characteristics [Ref. 26: pp. 9-10].
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b. Congruence Definition
Evaluation is a comparison of the congruence
between performance and objectives. This provides emphasis
on objective performance also [Ref . 26] . The measurement
definition considered evaluation to occur after the fact and
to measure some attribute. In contrast, the congruence
definition refers to on-going evaluation in meeting the
objectives. According to Stufflebeam, organizations pick
objectives which are specific and have objective measurable
results. To make the congruence definition work, there must
be some selection of objectives to be measured. Stufflebeam
further indicates that the congruence definition creates a
need for the evaluator to find short term measures of per-
formance. These indicators, identifiable outputs, or behaviors
come to be viewed as performance. These identifiable outputs
become the ultimate criteria of all organizational decisions.
The congruence definition has advantages, but the need to
find measurable objectives creates problems [Ref. 26].
c. Judgment Definition
The professional judgment definition allows full
evaluation of all organizational attributes, both quantifiable
and non-quantifiable, and is easy to implement [Ref. 26].
This definition is often applied where the dimensions to be
measured are difficult to define and more difficult to quan-
tify. The judgment definition has its problems. The evalua-
tion is, by definition, based upon the judgment of an individual
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which lacks objectivity identifying what data are used and
how they are used [Ref. 26].
Table 3.1, taken from Stuff lebeam, provides a
comparison of advantages and disadvantages of each definition.
2 . Principles of Evaluation
For an evaluation to be effective it must be consis-
tent with the purposes, objectives, and goals of the activity
being evaluated [Refs. 5,27,28]:
a. Evaluations must be conducted in terms of purpose
—
the evaluator and the evaluated must fully participate
and work for the common goal
.
b. Evaluation must be cooperative— all involved as both
the evaluators and evaluated must fully participate
and work for the common goal.
c. Evaluation must be continuous— it must be on-going;
a one time effort with no followup is an affront to
the professional concepts.
d. Evaluation must be specific— specificity is the key,
generalizations do little good to help remedy defi-
ciencies or to identify true strengths.
e. Evaluation must provide the means and focus for
trainers to be able to appraise themselves, their
practices, and their products.
f
.




Definitions and principles of evaluation were pre-
sented in this section. A single commonly agreed upon defini-
tion of evaluation does not exist. There is more general
agreement on the principles of evaluation and to a large
degree these embody a common sense approach for the usefulness
of any evaluation. Next, four evaluation theories are presenter.
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TABLE 3.1
Advantages and Disadvantages Accruing from Different
Definitions of Evaluation
Advantages








High degree of integration with
the process






Takes experience and expertise
into account




Inflexible because of time
and cost to produce new
instruments
Obscures judgments and the
criteria for maning them
Eliminates variables currently
considered as not measurable
or labels them unimportant
Places evaluator In tecnnical
role
Focuses narrowly on objectives
Elevates behavior as the ultimate
criterion of every action
Focuses on evaluation as a
terminal process
Dictated mainly because of
ignorance or lack of sophistication
Questionable reliability
Questionable objectivity
Not susceptible to ordinary
scientific, prudential measures
Both data and criteria are
ambiguous
Generalization very difficult
urce: Adopted from Ref. 26: p. 15.
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D. EVALUATION MODELS
There are diverse models and applications of evaluation.
This discussion is not intended to be all inclusive. What
is intended is to introduce a variety of models which exist
and to show their relationship to the questions pursued in
this research.
1. Management by Objective (MBQ)
In recent years probably no system of personnel
management has gained more attention than Management by
Objective introduced by Peter Drucker [Ref. 29]. The MBO
approach is applied to individual as well as organizational
evaluation systems.
The MBO Approach assumes that one would perform more
effectively because you have planned your own objec-
tives and could control your own behavior. [Ref. 16:
p. 316]
MBO takes a humanistic or human values approach to
managing people. The basic steps in MBO are as follows:
1. The subordinate proposes goals for the next time
period.
2. The subordinate and superior discuss, modify, and
reach agreement on the goals
.
3. Periodic formal and frequent informal review of the
goals and progress toward the goals.
4. Subordinate reports on performance at the end of
the period.
5. Repeat the cycle. [Ref. 16: p. 316]
MBO deals well with a number of problem areas in evaluation
systems. It is designed to facilitate two-way communication.
MBO has found success in both the private and public sector.
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In their article on "Employee Growth Through Performance
Management," Beer and Ruhr found success with employment of
MBO at Corning Glass Co. [Ref. 30] . In addition, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare found it a most valua-
ble system in pursuing management and control of their many
diversified programs [Ref. 31]. Figure 3.1 provides a simple
model of how MBO is designed. It should be noted that the
MBO model focuses on performance as identified and measured
through objectives agreed upon by supervisor and subordinate
[Ref. 32].
Feedback in the MBO System is scheduled at regular
intervals. The meetings can be used to compare results to
the objectives set as well as to help make future objectives
more realistic. The objectives themselves are determined by
higher level management in coordination with the employee
or unit. To a great extent the comparison of goals set and
achieved are reported by the individual being evaluated.
Typically the manager submits an evaluation of each objective




Feedback is handled by face to face conferences between the
evaluator and employee.
In a recent Marine Corps Gazette article, Major James


































Source 5 Adapted from [Ref. 32 : p. 223
J
Figure 3.1. Sample MBO Model
32
pay system used with high level GS employees. He referred
to MBO in the context of a personnel evaluation system;
however, it also has application here:
To improve performance counseling, we must get away
from subjective judgments through a more formal system
which concentrates on objectives. The merit pay
system provides a good model. [Ref. 33: p. 47]
Major Clarke's article provided support for the MBO
method because clear objectives are established and regular
communications are encouraged. In the Marine Corps' personnel
system, as in other areas of inspection and evaluation, pro-
fessional judgment has historically been used as the primary
method of evaluation and lack of specific objectives has
reinforced the reliance on the judgmental method.
MBO places a great emphasis on the objectives and the
regular feedback on how the evaluated worker is measuring up
to those objectives [Ref. 16]. MBO further emphasizes dis-
playing the individual's strengths and weaknesses to himself,
rather than to others. Although MBO emphasizes timely,
accurate, and objective feedback, the details of that feed-
back can only be spelled out when a system is input to a
specific organization [Ref. 30]. It further encourages the
feedback be given on a continual basis, not "saved up for an
end of the year inquisition" [Ref. 16: p. 317].
2 . Evaluation and Authority
A comprehensive and ongoing study of evaluation and
authority was conducted by Scott and Dornbusch (19 77) . In
their study of professional organizations, results were
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gathered from university faculty members, clergy, public
school teachers, principals, nurses, and others. They found:
Organizations are power structures in which some partici-
pants give differential access to organizational
rewards and penalties in order to control other
participants. [Ref. 34: p. 134]
The Scott-Dornbusch studies present a conceptual model
of the relationship of evaluation and authority. As a result o
these studies, they developed the model presented in Figure
3.2. The model is a systems analysis approach which provides
for monitoring and regulating by means of a feedback loop.
This approach concentrates on the involvement of each actor
in the process. The actors in the Scott-Dornbusch model are
described as follows: The allocator gives the responsibility
for performing the task. The criteria setter is concerned
with assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of a task
performance. To a large measure the criteria is determined
by the goal toward which the performance is directed. The
determination of which information to use in order to arrive
at a performance evaluation is the responsibility of the
sampler . The appraiser uses the information on the sampled
indicators and transforms the observed values into scores.
The goal of the evaluation process is to provide a measure
of the performer based on performance and outcome [Ref. 34 J
.
The manager must get each of these individuals in the decision-
making process and coordinate their activities. Emphasis is
placed in this model on communications among the right-holders.





















Source •• Adapted from [Ref. 34- p. 20
J
Figure 3.2 Model of Evaluation Process with Communication
Links Among Right- Holders.
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rights by the organization. The authority rights are granted
to the allocator, criteria setter, sampler and appraiser.
There are a variety of interconnecting links which may exist
between these rights-holders which define the authority
structure within any given organization. Thus the formal
evaluation process is based on the structure of the inter-
connection among the right-holders [Ref. 34].
The Evaluation and Authority Feedback Model describes
performance by direct and indirect measures. An example of
a direct measure would be the number of units produced as a
measure of labor productivity. An indirect measure is the
number of professional papers written to evaluate the produc-
tivity of a scientist or scholar [Ref. 34]. The variety of
samples requires judgment on the part of the evaluator to
determine what is high or low performance so judgment must
be used by the evaluator. Thus, accurate appraisal of the
sample taken requires a complete knowledge of the task, the
performance, and the specific circumstances. Based on all of
these measures it is decided what, if anything, should be
conveyed to the performer concerning quality of the task
performed [Ref. 34].
3 . Practice of Program Evaluation
Anderson and Ball take an applied approach to program
evaluation. They identify six specific purposes of program
evaluation [Ref. 35]:
1. to contribute to decision about program installation,
2. to contribute to decisions about program continuation,
expansion, or certification,
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3. to contribute to decisions about program modifications,
4. to obtain evidence to rally support for a program,
5. to obtain evidence to rally opposition to a program,
6. to contribute to the understanding of basic psychologi-
cal, social, and other programs. [Ref . 35: p. 4]
Anderson and Ball emphasize the practice aspect that
evaluations can address a wide variety of questions and pro-
vide many useful services. Their experience is primarily
with social programs, but it is applicable to this study.
They identify a total of seven types of evaluation methods:
1. The experimental and quasi-experimental study,
2. Correlation methods,
3. Surveys,
4. Personnel or client assessment,
5. Systematic expert judgment,
6. Clinical or case studies,
7. Informal observation and testimony.
The real richness of the ideas presented by Anderson
and Ball involve their emphasis on feedback which they refer
to as the: Communication and Dissemination of Results. They
emphasize the need for communications of the results to be
bi-directional. The effective communications of results are
viewed as a sign of the positive health of the program. Evalu-
ators should take pride in presenting and disseminating their
results. The dissemination is more than merely a phase tacked
on the end of a program; it involves more than simply telling
the findings. At a minimum, what the dissemination involves
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is that the results should include information about the
evaluation plans and procedures as well as the findings.
There are also several criteria provided to guide the dis-
semination to various audiences. First, if an evaluation is
worth doing, other groups than the evaluated organization have
some interest in finding out about the results. Second, is
that, given different audiences, several mediums/methods of
dissemination may be called for. Anderson and Ball classify
some fifteen different audiences that should at least be con-
sidered for dissemination of results [Ref . 35]
.
Use of results is another consideration once the
evaluation is completed. The logical expectation is that the
decision maker will use the results to make rational future
decisions. Weiss lists several reasons why that is not always
the case. The nature of the organization is sometimes opposed
to the use of the results; however, if the decision maker and
the evaluator have maintained close communications throughout
the process, the potential objections can be reduced [Refs.
35,36]. Particular consideration must be given not only to
factual evaluation of each program, but also the salesmanship
aspect of presenting the evaluations.
Anderson and Ball have adapted, from a paper by J. S.
Berke a structure which they suggest should be applied when
writing evaluation reports.
•Brevity and clarity. Critical findings should be
summarized clearly and simply at the outset.
•Timeliness—to be useful and utilized, results must
be reported according to other peoples ' schedules and
not the evaluator' s research clock.
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•Interim products and reports—these help prepare deci-
sion makers for the impact of larger, later evaluation
reports. Besides, they can allow preliminary planning
for use even before the final report is available.
•Responsiveness--he notes here that traditional researchers
tend to make questions more interesting, designs more
elegant, the analysis more comprehensive, and the use of
recommendations more guarded than necessary.
[Ref. 35: pp. 107-108]
In summary, the program evaluator has the responsibility
to push the results of the evaluation and to bring them to
the attention of all those who should be made aware [Ref. 35].
4 . Critical Incident Evaluation
Critical Incident Evaluation Program involves manage-
ment writing regular reports on the performance they observe.
The critical incident process has as its roots the idea that
actual behavior should be appraised, not traits of behavior.
It is an attempt to justify ratings based on specific inci-
dents that provide support evidence for the evaluation.
Levinson places strong emphasis on the need to evaluate on
how things get done and not just results [Ref. 37] . Levinson
argues that in reality people are evaluated on the "how", but
many are led to believe that they are just judged based on
results
.
Thus, the profit oriented manager pulls his company
out of the "red", but is criticized for the methods used to
do it. Levinson cites many deficiencies with current evalua-
tion systems. One is that no matter how well-defined the
dimensions for appraising performance on a quantitative basis,
judgments on performance are always subjective and impression-
istic [Ref. 37]. Second, delay in giving feedback creates
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frustration both when performance is good and credit is de-
served, and when performance is bad and criticism is rendered
long after the performance. Levinson views performance
evaluation not as a technique, but a process involving both
people and data. Thus, the process is inadequate [Ref. 37].
Levinson proposes that an effective critical incident
model be composed of the following [Ref. 37J :
1. A dynamic job description—one which amplifies
statements of job responsibility and desired
outcomes by describing the emotional and
behavioral topography of the task.
2. A critical incident process—this requires jointly
setting objectives and discussing each piece of
behavior that is judged good or bad by the manager.
3. A psychological support system— to accomplish
this, the manager must learn to cope with feelings
or guilt over the appraisal. He calls this upward
appraisal concept in which managers who develop
employees through their effective appraisal should
be compensated. [Ref. 37]
The whole critical incident process involves a con-
tinuous flow of feedback to the evaluated employee.
Although the critical incident process by its very
nature should lead to a continuous review and communication
on positive and negative behavior, that is not always the
case. Also the critical incident itself is often a subjec-
tive evaluation on the part of the supervisor. The system
should focus attention on actual behavior rather than on
employee traits. Also it provides an opportunity for the
employee to find out specifically how to perform if that
individual wants to be rated higher the next time. This
system does encourage regular feedback since the supervisor
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can hardly wait to the end of a period to provide the critical
incident feedback [Ref
. 38] . One of the major factors supporting
this system is that the critical incident process takes the
surprise out of the annual or semi-annual evaluation. All
those incidents viewed by the supervisor as critical would
have already been brought to the attention of and discussed
with the subordinate. This technique provides more regular
feedback to the subordinate because both good and bad inci-
dents should be noted continually. Also if the employee feels
unfairly judged, that individual may appeal the criticism
immediately rather than waiting a long period of time [Ref. 37].
E. SPECIFIC EVALUATION MODELS APPLIED TO THE MILITARY
The approaches to the evaluation process discussed thus
far have been general in nature. However, evaluation proc-
esses specific to military environments were also reviewed.
Following are four evaluation approaches to the military
which were reviewed in detail.
1 . Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)
The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) for
Infantry Battalions was reviewed for this study. A detailed
brief on ARTE? was provided by the G-3, 7th Infantry Division
[Ref. 39 J . The Army Program specifics are provided for
Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, and Ranger units in one
volume [Ref. 40]. That guide is further supported by local
guidance at each command.
41
As an example of the ARTEP, the Infantry ARTEP is
discussed. The Infantry ARTEP Evaluation has four purposes:
(other references exist for ARTEP application to other areas,
such as Armor and Mechanized units)
:
1. Establish infantry unit training missions with
specified tasks, conditions, and standards of
performance for combat-critical missions.
2. Under simulated combat conditions, train and
evaluate the ability of the unit.
3. Evaluate the effectiveness of past training of all
echelons of the Battalion.
4. Assess future training needs. [Ref. 40]
The evaluation is broken into three phases:
1. Critique of Leaders
2. Evaluation of Whole Battalion
3. Written Report
The ARTEP employs the following philosophy:
1. The evaluation is conducted two levels down (Division
evaluates Battalion)
2. Battalion ARTEP ' s are scheduled every 18 months.
3. Companies/Platoons/Squadrons are evaluated annually.
4. Subunit evaluators focus on the end evaluation.
5. Evaluations are scheduled in sequential progression
(squad, platoon, company, then battalion)
6. Scheduled preparation time is five weeks for a
Battalion
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7. Fence off the unit for two weeks following the exer-
cise (no other requirements are placed on the unit
during this period)
8. Use operating force tactics
9. Do not evaluate during other training or field
exercises. [Ref. 39
J
The ARTEP Evaluations are conducted strictly within
the divisional unit. The Assistant Division Commander is
designated "exercise director, " but a sister battalion is
designated as the force to provide the senior evaluator,
another lieutenant colonel as well as company and other
evaluators. The ARTEP is viewed as a training evaluation.
The ARTEP System provides a combination of both objec-
tive and subjective feedback to the evaluated unit. All of
the tasks evaluated in the ARTEP evaluation are reported on
a Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory basis. All unsatisfactory or not
evaluated ratings must be explained in the remarks. This
data is placed on a standardized data collection sheet. A
copy is provided to the evaluated unit shortly after the
exercise is completed. Additionally a copy of the data sheet
is forwarded (without any identifying unit data) to the U.S.
Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA. The data forwarded
to higher headquarters is for the purpose of future training
development efforts and for use in improving the ARTEP doc-
trine, devices, and techniques Army-wide [Ref. 40]. The
overall evaluation given to a unit is a Satisfactory/
Unsatisfactory. No percentile scores are associated with or
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computed for the ARTEP results. Thus no comparison is made
from unit to unit using ARTEP data [Ref. 39].
In addition to the written report, a continuous review
and exchange of comments between the evaluator and unit is
encouraged. Shortly after the ARTEP is completed, an oral
debrief is held for all key personnel of the battalion and
the evaluators. In some cases the detailed (good) evaluations
of units to the squad level are announced to all of the troops
at formation. This technique is viewed as a positive motiva-
tion for the small units and their leaders [Ref. 39].
2 . Funk Conceptual Model of Unit Performance
A recent study by Steven Funk [Ref. 13] attempted to
model combat unit effectiveness for the U.S. Army. He found
many of the same difficulties in defining effectiveness that
this author found in defining readiness. He described effec-
tiveness as follows:
Individual evaluators determine unit effectiveness
based upon some explicit or intuitive constraint of
what units are supposed to do and how that is achieved.
Unit effectiveness is determined by evaluating both
outcomes and processes, and is determined for perform-
ance on all tasks presented to the unit whether they
are combat related or not. [Ref. 13: p. 19]
He interviewed groups of officers and senior enlisted,
primarily battalion commanders, company commanders, staff
officers, unit officers, and first sergeants. He also re-
viewed a wide array of existing predictive models from the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. He identified early readiness
studies such as Army Training Study (ARTS) 1977-1978, which
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concluded that readiness should be viewed from a perspective
of relationships among personnel, weapons, equipment, re-
sources, detractors, and incentives. He also reviewed the
Navy's 1974 report on readiness which stated, "Organizational
effectiveness implies an evaluative or judgmental process
against an expectation or standard" [Ref. 13: p. 11].
The result of his studies concluded that military
unit effectiveness is far more readily conceptualized than
measured [Ref. 13]. Part of the problem of measuring mili-
tary unit effectiveness is operationally defining readiness
in a peacetime environment.
Funk referenced Etzioni who noted that organizations
attempt to achieve a balanced distribution of resources
across needs and did not attempt to maximize satisfaction in
one area [Ref. 13] . Funk concluded that military units in
peacetime have great difficulty in maximizing effectiveness
or readiness because they really face not one objective, but
a whole array of competing priorities all calling for their
resources. His studies resulted in the proposed conceptual
model in Figure 3.3.
This model is referred to as the Unit Performance
Systems model. It describes behavior as the interrelation-
ships of technology, formal and informal unit structure,
perceived unit requirements and priorities, available re-
sources, unit climate, unit process, cause of evaluation of
unit actions, and the unit operating environment [Ref. 11].
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Figure 3.3 Unit Performance Systems Model












. Hayes et al., Statistical Model of Combat Effectiveness
In 1977, a cross-sectional study for the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency was conducted. An effort was
made to identify through detailed statistical methods key
factors which contributed to levels of success in 22 combat
engagements ranging from World War II to Vietnam. The study
was aimed at determining the effectiveness of infantry battalions
based on the judgment of experienced Marine Corps officers in-
volved in these engagements. Multi-variate statistical analy-
sis was used to examine the data results. The study revealed
that adaptive behavior by units, that is reaction to the com-
bat environment, was the single most important discriminator
between successful and unsuccessful performance. They also
identified three types of activity which appeared to be
closely related to mission accomplishment: command and
planning (strongly related)
, supporting fires (moderately
associated) , and coordination function (relatively weak and
appeared to require effective command and planning before it
made a difference) [Ref. 18].
This study defined "combat effectiveness" as
. . .the ability of a unit to accomplish a military
mission. As such, combat effectiveness refers to
performance in a hostile environment. [Ref. 18: pp. 1-2]
As such the focus on the effectiveness of a military unit is
placed on outcomes and effectiveness and can only be measured
by mission accomplishment. The infantry battalion was seen
as not operating in a vacuum, but rather in a world of
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obstacles and constraints. Thus the adaptability was an
important element in performance. Besides adaptability, Hayes
identified a number of key elements which included:
•maneuver during the action
•preparatory air, artillery, and naval gunfire
•communications
•quality of planning and information as well as others.
[Ref. 18: pp. 1-18]
This study was done during the period when MCCRES was
being developed. One important observation made here with
regard to feedback was that, although MCCRES is comprehensive
and standardized, a great deal of information is currently
passing through the hands of the evaluators that could be
extremely valuable to the evaluated units [Ref. 18].
4 . Sassone Economic Model of Training Effectiveness
A fourth approach to effectiveness is taken by
Sassone, who has taken an economic view which is different
from the traditional economic approach to evaluating military
training programs. The traditional approach is to evaluate
the training on its projected costs and benefits. The Sassone
approach requires that any new training program be compared
directly with existing programs that it will replace or
amplify. Traditionally equipment and training are judged
simply on their ability to function for the intended purpose.
The training programs are particularly difficult to evaluate
because of the necessity of measuring the impact of the train-
ing on the trainee. In the private sector training programs
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are generally judged on their effectiveness by the change in
lifetime earnings of the trainee after the program [Ref. 41].
If the cost of the training program is less than the lifetime
increase in wages, then this program is judged to be economi-
cally worthwhile. However, training programs in the mili-
tary cannot be judged this same way, because there is currently
no way to measure their contribution toward readiness, sus-
tainability, or effectiveness since these are not commodities
or traded in the market place [Ref. 41]
.
Sassone's methodology requires that when a new type
of training for an individual or unit is developed, it must
be stated in specific terms to what extent it substitutes for
existing programs. The constraint in this case is the train-
ing budget for the specific type of training. There are
three steps in this methodology [Ref. 41].
(1) An equation relating training inputs and outputs must
be developed. This requires a comparison of the two types
of training under consideration (see Figure 3.4). The
figure shows different levels of effectiveness which can be
achieved with various combinations of the two types of train-
ing. The curve shows all the levels of effectiveness which
can be achieved with the various combinations. The shape of
the curves describe the substitute ability of one training
type for the other.
(2) Relationship of cost and use data must be obtained.
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Figure 3.4 A Hypothetical Training Input vs.
Output Relationship.
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the training program under evaluation; operational costs, and
training budgets for the training manager of the program.
(3) The last step requires the development of a relation-
ship between training and effectiveness.
Where potentially greater effectiveness is available
at greater cost, the issue is simply whether the
greater effectiveness is worth the greater cost.
[Ref. 41: p. 41]
Sassone fails to specify how the relation of training and
effectiveness is obtained. It is assumed in this study that
the relationship is identified by some evaluation method such
as MCCRES . Measures such as those generalized by ARTEP allow
for no relative measure of effectiveness which is required for
this type of comparison.
The cost-effectiveness equation is then developed
by optimum use of available training resources at each level
of the training budget. The term "optimum" in Sassone*
s
proposal is one that seems to be in conflict with other
theorists. Funk [Ref. 13] for instance indicates that many
competing priorities take resources from the unit, thus
precluding optimality of resource application.
Figure 3.5 represents a relation between cost and a
sample program. Figure 3.5 is described by Sassone as starting
at a minimal level, indicating that some level of effective-
ness would exist even without training. The curve initially
rises rapidly but starts to level off as maximum effectiveness
is reached. As better training programs are conceived, the
middle of this curve would shift up. If some new program were
51
Troining cost vs. effectiveness























Source 1 Adapted from [Ref. 41 : p. 41
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Figure 3.5. The Military Value of a
Training Program.
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a perfect substitute of an existing one, the new curve would
overlay the existing one. Upward shifts in the curve can be
caused by a greater level of effectiveness achieved for a
lower cost. The Figure 3.5 shows how the military value of
various training programs can be compared with other or exist-
ing programs. Additionally, one must consider opportunity
costs, funds used for research and development of new pro-
grams which the service could otherwise have devoted to
existing programs [Ref. 41] .
The military value of the new training program is repre-
sented by the increment in the current training budget
needed to increase effectiveness by the same amount
as the increase in effectiveness associated with the
new program. [Ref. 41: p. 42]
The opportunity cost of a new military training program is
determined by spreading the front end costs equally over
the units trained per year and the expected life time of the
program applying the appropriate discount rate. Figure 3.5
is used to compare the military value of a training program
by using the cost-effectiveness ratio, if the military value
is less than the opportunity cost, then the new program would
not be considered economically feasible [Ref. 41],
5 . Summary
This section reviewed four approaches to evaluation
that have recently been developed for applications to the
military. The ARTEP employed [Ref. 40] by the Army provided
a process of evaluation which has much in common with MCCRES
especially in its application to similar organizations. The
conceptual model by Funk [Ref. 13] provided a view not only
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of the elements involved in training, but also of some of
the barriers and constraints that units must face in a peace-
time environment. The results of the Hayes et al., Statistical
Model [Ref. 18] were valuable in that specific characteris-
tics were identified that led to success in actual combat
engagements. Finally the Sassone, Economic Training Model
was presented [Ref. 41] which proposed some new thoughts on
the subject of evaluating military training programs. The
ideas brought forth in these studies are of use in the examina-
tion of MCCRES in that they provide a rich background against
which MCCRES can be viewed.
F . FEEDBACK
...studies have shown that accurate feedback about
quality of work is a strong stimulus to good perform-
ance. . .People work better when they know how well they
are doing in relation to some meaningful standard.
[Ref. 42: p. 174]
This final section of the chapter discusses feedback.
Feedback is variously described by different writers as feed-
back [Refs. 27,29,37,43], feedback control [Ref. 16J
,
communications [Ref. 34] and further as dissemination,
communications, and utilization [Ref. 35]. Whatever the
feedback is called, it is common to all of the models dis-
cussed. Feedback is a necessary part of all evaluation
systems
.
Control to be effective, requires timely, accurate, and
dependable indicators of effectiveness. Feedback should
provide information that is adequate to suggest appro-
priate action. To that end, reports must point to
significant developments, as distinguished from what is
normal, usual, and to be expected. [Ref. 32: p. 504]
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Flamholtz [Ref. 44] has presented a typical model,
Figure 3. 6,of an organizational control system which places
emphasis on the feedback loop. He describes feedback as a
necessary managerial function of the control systems which
identifies problems [Ref. 44 J
.
This model provides an example of how the essential feed-
back loop functions in an organizational control or evaluation
system. The feedback loop provides an interactive process
that allows for routine recycling of the results of a compari-
son of the observed performance to the measurement system.
The essential element to observe here is that feedback is a
standard fixture of the evaluation system. All systems viewed
that provide a diagrammatic model include a feedback
mechanism. In addition Anderson and Ball and the ARTEP
provided detailed structures for feedback.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has covered the topics of management, manage-
ment control, evaluation, and feedback. These topics can be
seen as moving from the general to the specific. The bound-
aries between these topics are not clear cut. There is a
great deal of overlap in the fields of management, organiza-
tional control, evaluation, and feedback. This is particu-
larly true when they are viewed from different disciplines.
For instance, much of what is classified in education as
evaluation, would be classified under control in organizational
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Figure 3.6 Model of Organizational Control System.
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to terminology for feedback. Theorists in the same and
different disciplines often use various terms to describe
feedback.
Feedback was discussed with emphasis on relating the
many different terms used to describe feedback. In addition
the feedback loop which is common to all models reviewed
has been discussed. The theory of feedback is essential to
this study and the many ideas and structures placed on it
will give much insight when applied to MCCRES. Certain ele-
ments such as: brevity and clarity, timeliness, interim
products and reports, and responsiveness [Ref. 35] have almost
universal application to feedback theory. The MBO , Evaluation
and Authority, Critical Incident, and ARTEP all provide a
wealth of insight on how feedback techniques should be
applied.




In the last chapter a detailed examination was made of
management control, four general evaluation systems, and four
specific evaluation systems which apply to the military.
This should provide the reader with a background against
which to view MCCRES. In this chapter attention is given in
detail to the MCCRES itself, its development, explanation of
the system's mission performance standards, and the evalua-
tion process applied by MCCRES as well as the reports and
feedback designed into the current system. The goal of this
chapter is to provide the reader with a general understanding
of how the MCCRES is applied, based on the most current
Marine Corps directives.
The purpose of the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evalua-
tion System (MCCRES) is to provide a timely and accurate
evaluation of readiness of Fleet Marine Forces, includ-
ing reserve units, to accomplish assigned missions.
[Ref. 1: p. 1-A-l]
The formal MCCRES must be given at least once every two years
for all FMF units for which performance standards have been
written.
A. DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURE
The development of the MCCRES was begun with a review of
the various combat readiness measurements then currently in
use. Many of these consisted of individual, as well as unit,
evaluations and were in the form of inspections which stressed
appearance more than combat proficiency [Ref. 1]
.
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The MCCRES was structured to access the ability of all
Marine Corps Combat units: air and ground combat, combat
support, and combat service support. Specifically it was
designed to provide:
-Performance standards based on assigned missions
-A standardized evaluation process
-A standardized reporting system
-Feedback to units indicating strengths and weaknesses.
[Ref. 1: p. l-A-2]
The MCCRES was designed to provide a detailed analysis
of the units' operational capabilities and to specifically
identify strengths and weaknesses through comparison with
doctrine under simulated combat conditions. The doctrine is
embodied in a checklist of requirements. The hierarchy of
these qualities is identified from general to specific as
Mission Performance Standards (MPS) , each of which consists
of three parts: Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements. The
MPS set the Commandant's acceptable standards for tactical
performance throughout the Marine Corps. Based on compari-
son of the unit's performance to the MPS under simulated
conditions, a determination is made of "Combat Ready/Not
Combat Ready." The MCCRES is designed for both formal and
informal evaluation. The informal evaluation can be pro-
vided by the unit itself measuring its performance standards.
The formal evaluation is accomplished by higher-level commands
normally evaluating a selection of MPS. For the formal
evaluation certain MPS are required in all evaluations and
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others are selected by the organization directing the evalua-
tion based on detailed guidance in Ref. 1. A cross section
of MPS's are used to provide a statement of the organiza-
tion's operational readiness.
The evaluators employed in the formal system must be ex-
perienced, capable personnel. The overall system is designed
to identify specific operational deficiencies and the nature
of any latent or potential problems. The MCCRES cycle is
described in Figure 4.1.
B. MISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (MPS)
In building the MCCRES framework it was decided that the
evaluation would be structured around a set of Mission Per-
formance Standards that establish, on a Marine Corps-wide
basis, acceptable operational performance. Derivation of
these standards was accomplished by using five interrelated
concepts concerning determination of combat readiness. The
concepts are:
- Standards must be objective
- Standards must define for the evaluator what quality
means
- Standards must be based on published doctrine
- Standards must involve the performance of individual
Marines in evaluation of unit combat readiness
- Standards must be simple for the evaluator. [Ref. 1]
The MPS are defined in detail in Volumes II through VIII
of Marine Corps Order 3501.2. Each of these volumes pertains





















Source : Adopted from [Ref. 1 : p. I-A-6J
Figure 4.1. MCCRES Cycle
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Volume II pertains to Infantry and Volume III to Rotary Wing
Observation Squadrons. In this way the volume lists the
MPS's involved for each unique type of unit.
Each MPS is further broken down into three major parts:
-The Task to be performed
-The Condition under which the task is to be performed
-The Requirements which must be accomplished to success-
fully fulfill the task. [Ref. 1: p. I-B4J
Examples of the MPS, Tasks, Conditions, and Requirements
are provided in Figure 4.2.
To assist the Evaluator when the Requirement does not
completely define the quality of performance necessary, Key
Indicators (KI) are provided. These KI's are defined to
clarify and explain the requirements [Ref. 1] . Samples of
Key Indicators are presented in Figure 4.3.
For simplicity and to reduce the need for subjective judg-
ments, all MPS's were designed to permit the Evaluator only
three possible outcomes for each requirement: Yes/No/Not
Applicable. Those MPS's dealing with the performance of indi-
vidual Marines, Exercise of Command and Control, and Fire
Support Coordination must be used during every evaluation.
The reason that all MPS's are not employed during each
evaluation is a limitation of time and resources [Ref. 1J
.
In addition to the evaluation of MPS's which use a simu-
lated combat environment against an aggressor force, a series
of MCCRES Standard Performance Tests (SPT) have also been
developed. Examples of these types of proficiency tests are:
62
MISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARD 2B.3—MOVEMENT TO CONTACT












task is three hours
after delivery of
the order to the
unit.
Adopted from (Ref. 1:
p. 1-B-5)
2B. 3. 1.1—Receipt of order
acknowledged to higher
hq.
2B. 3. 1.2—Warning order issued to
all suPordinate units







2B.3.1.4— All echelons prepare for
move; inspect material,
pack equipment, and iden-
tify specialized
requirements.
2B. 3. 1.5—Weapons test fired if
situation permits.
2B.3. 1.6—Communications checks com-
pleted and communication
security materials issued.
2B. 3. 1.7—Movement plan formulated (Kl
2E. 3. 1.8—Movement order issued (Kl).
2B.3.1.9—Readiness for movement re-
ported to higher hq.




General information on the situation.
Units to make the move and anticipated sequence.
Anticipated time of move.
Anticipated route and destination.
STAFF COORDINATION
MUST SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS:
Route reconnaissance—map, physical, or aerial photo.
Support needed from higher hq— air, vehicle, or firepower.
Fire support coverage throughout movement.
Cover and concealment available enroute.
Logistic aspects affected by location change.
BASIC PLAN
MUST BE BASED ON:
Movement at speed desired by higher hq.
Control of ail elements during move.





Definition of all control measures to be used: check points, phase lines, march objectives, etc.
Specific missions for attached and/or support elements: tanks, engineers, TOW, etc.
Identification of initial point from which move will begin.
Assignment to march serials. _ _
Time of departure.
Clear identification of available outside support.
Detailed security procedures.
As much information on threat as is available:
Emphasis on specialized weaponry tnat can affect the move: ATGM, artillery, air, etc.
Source: Adopted from (Ref. 1.P: p. I-B-6)
Figure 4.3 Sample of Key Indicators for Evaluator
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Foot Mobility Test, Dragon Gunner's Test, Engineer Route
Reconnaissance Test, and Aircraft Recognition Test. The
SPT's are used to support the MPS ' s and are tested objectively
prior to the MCCRES operational/readiness test. The SPT is
formated exactly as the MPS; however, a 'Yes' must be achieved
in each area before the MCCRES is continued. Any unit not
found proficient in the SPT portion of MCCRES will not be
tested on the tactical portion.
C. PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT FOR THE EVALUATION
The key to successful application of each MCCRES is the
evaluation process. Selection and training of evaluators is
at the very heart of the evaluation process. Credibility of
the evaluators is essential to the success of MCCRES. The
evaluators selected are to have the requisite skills and
recent experience as to preclude the need for a long, detailed
school for the evaluators. However, as needed and as time
allows, training is provided to evaluators. Since all evalu-
ation systems require some judgment on the part of the
evaluators, and MCCRES is no exception, sound judgment is a
prerequisite for each evaluator chosen.
The evaluation is structured with the Commanding General's
Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) and Fleet Marine Force
Atlantic (FMFLANT) as the Evaluation/Exercise Commander (s)
(EC) for the initiation and conduct of all formal MCCRES
Evaluations. The responsibilities of the Evaluation/Exercise
Commanders are outlined in detail in Ref. 1.
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1. Evaluation/Exercise Director (ED) — is designated by the
Exercise Commander (EC) and is responsible to prepare
for, conduct, and report the formal MCCRES evalua-
tions. Normally the Commanding General of the respec-
tive Marine Division or Wing whose subunit is to be
evaluated is designated ED.
2. Tactical Exercise Controller (TEC) — is designated by
the ED, along with an appointed staff, to serve as the
control agency for conducting the exercise. The TEC
compiles and analyzes the results of the evaluation.
The TEC is also responsible for the detailed training
of the evaluators as well as development of a detailed
exercise scenario. At the end of the evaluation a
formal report is prepared for the ED describing the
combat readiness of the evaluated unit. A detailed
critique should also be conducted for all involved in
the evaluation. In the critique the results of the
evaluated MPS are to be highlighted with respective
strengths and weaknesses.
3. Evaluators—should be prepared for the role through
successful past professional experiences as well as
through any detailed school provided. The MCCRES
evaluators have three roles: exercise controller, umpire
and performance evaluator. As a performance evaluator,
they apply the detailed MPS ' s contained in the appro-
priate volume for the unit and they are evaluating and
actually make the 'Yes/No/Not Applicable' determinations
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for individual tasks. The evaluators must possess a
complete and thorough understanding of the Mission
Performance Standards being evaluated. The
evaluators must make any notes needed on an Evaluator
Work Sheet that are necessary to support judgment
during the process. [Ref. 1]
4. Senior Evaluator—determined by rank. Evaluator for
the unit evaluated compiles the data sheets from all
evaluators and should conduct a post exercise wrap up.
Any questions or conflicts should be resolved at that
time. The process must result in the senior evaluator
being assured that his data provides an accurate reflec-
tion of the overall unit performance. The senior
evaluator then makes the determination of the overall
unit evaluation of "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready."
The senior evaluator provides the data sheets to TEC
who compiles the detailed analysis and presents it to
the evaluation/exercise director [Ref. 1].
5. Evaluation Staffing— is the responsibility of the ED
for both selecting and training all evaluators prior
to a MCCRES . It is desirable to obtain evaluators
from adjacent commands, not directly related to the
organization being evaluated. A more complete discussion
of providing the evaluators can be found in Ref. 6.
D. COMPUTER ADAPTED MCCRES
The Marine Corps Combat Readiness System Software Appli-
cation (MCCRESSA) , is designed to furnish all organizations
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involved with MCCRES a means of assessing and analyzing data
pertaining to MCCRES evaluations. Specifically it provides
the following:
A list of mission performance standards, tasks, and
requirements
.
...the chief evaluator with a rapid overview and selected
analysis of the units evaluation.
Identifies unit readiness based upon mission performance
standards tested within the applied scenario.
Provides unit commanders a list of unit readiness defi-
ciencies to initiate corrective action or obtain
higher command level assistance.
Reviews unit evaluations to determine validity of mission
performance standards and doctrine.
Reviews unit's evaluations to determine limitation/inade-
quacies in officer education programs. [Ref. 1: p. I-E2]
All of the formal evaluation reports are input to the
Headquarters Marine Corps data base [Ref. 1]
.
E. REPORTS
At the end of a MCCRES, after the Evaluator Data Sheets
have been compiled for all units evaluated, the TEC and
senior evaluators should review the sheets and make a deter-
mination of "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready" for each unit
evaluated. This recommendation is based on an initial review
of "Yes's/No's" for all requirements, taking into account
any tasks or MPS ' s that were "demand elements that must be





"The primary purpose of MCCRES reports is to provide
the feedback necessary for commanders to initiate corrective
action that will improve combat readiness" [Ref. 1: p. 1-D1]
.
The results should be reflected in improved training
objectives and may also affect resource allocation of per-
sonnel, equipment, or logistics support. To assist in the
reallocation of critical resources, a detailed report is
provided through the chain of command to the unit evaluated.
This report provides a short subjective comment as well as
percentile scores and weighting for each Section, MPS, Task,
and Requirement evaluated. (See Appendix A—Sample MCCRESSA
printout for one MPS
.
)
Additionally a report is provided in message format
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) within 10 days
following the end of an evaluation indicating the overall
evaluation "Combat Ready/Not Combat Ready" and unit identifi-
cation. Within 30 days a detailed report of the MCCRESSA
printout is provided to the CMC. The report should include
comments or recommendations for improvement or revisions to
the MCCRES. The purpose of the follow up report is to allow
CMC to: provide assistance in the review of doctrine, tactics
techniques, education and training programs, and validation
of MCCRES elements . This report also serves to highlight
trends and repeated deficiencies, and permit analysis for




Based on Marine Corps policy, MCCRES reports are not
designed to be used to compare the combat readiness of vari-
ous units. This is a result of differences in unit type,
services, environmental conditions, and resource allocations.
The evaluation indexes on MCCRES reports are provided to
indicate an approximate status of the unit's combat readiness
during a particular evaluation [Ref . 1] . It can be said that
the MCCRES provides a snap shot of the unit at the time of
the evaluation.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter presented an overview of the MCCRES including
a discussion of the Development and Structure, Mission Per-
formance Standards, Personnel Assignment for the Evaluation,
Computer Adapted MCCRES and Reports . The purpose was to
provide the reader with a general background of how the
MCCRES is intended to be implemented throughout the Marine
Corps, based on systems design and policies.
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V. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The research method used had three distinct phases.
First, a general literature review was conducted. Second,
a
specific literature review of MCCRES and related defense pub-
lications was undertaken. Third, a detailed field study was
made to obtain first hand information from those involved
with the development, application, and oversite of MCCRES.
A. AUDIENCE
Anderson and Ball discussed [Ref. 35] the importance of
identifying the audience when researching and distributing
results. To this end the primary audience for this study
are the planners who conduct periodic reviews and revisions
of MCCRES doctrine, that is, the Readiness Branch at KQMC.
Additionally the audience should include all those involved
with MCCRES or who will be involved with MCCRES, as well as
commanders, evaluators, planners in organizations and others
who would benefit from understanding the findings presented
herein.
B. GENERAL LITERATURE REVIEW
The results of the general literature review are presented
in Chapter III. A background in management control, general
evaluation systems as well as specific examples of evaluation
systems applied to the military provided a backdrop against
which MCCRES can be viewed. It is evident from Chapter IV
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that MCCRES has incorporated into it many of the positive
aspects of general evaluation systems theory [Refs. 5,7,22,
27,28,34,35]
.
C. SPECIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW
The specific literature review consisted of articles on
MCCRES appearing in the various defense publications [Refs. 2,
7,11,14,33,39, and 40] as well as the technical reports and
articles available on MCCRES and other military training and
readiness evaluation systems [Refs. 4,8,12,13,18,40]. This
specific literature review not only provided a basis for
understanding the MCCRES from the standpoint of its proponents
and detractors, but it also provided some understanding of
alternatives to MCCRES. The detailed reports made available
by George Washington University were invaluable in understand-
ing the background and initial development of the MCCRES
[Refs. 3,4,11].
D. FIELD STUDY
The field study was conducted to obtain first hand infor-
mation on MCCRES. Personal interviews, telephone interviews,
and a visit to the Readiness Branch HQMC, George Washington
University, and to the Army's 7th Infantry Division were em-
ployed to that end. The interviews were semi-structured.
The stated purpose of the interviews was not just to answer
the specific questions posed, but to stimulate thought and
identify as many ideas as possible on how the MCCRES could
be improved. Although the scope of this project was limited
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by its primary emphasis on feedback, other valuable informa-
tion was elicited.
1 . Sample
The sample group chosen consisted of those who had
the most experience and most vested interest in the MCCRES
feedback. Because the MCCRES evaluations are most often
given to infantry battalions and aviation squadrons, these
were identified as the primary target group. Battalion and
squadron commanders, senior evaluators , and division/squadron
MCCRES officers were identified as the primary sources of
information since they have the most detailed involvement with
the MCCRES feedback. Upon interviewing the sample it was
also found that many of the officers had been involved in
several MCCRES * s and in different capacities. Thus many had
experience as both a senior evaluator and a battalion or
squadron commander of an evaluated unit. Divisional or
wing MCCRES officers were also a rich source of information
because of their daily involvement with MCCRES. The secondary
source of information were "others involved with MCCRES."
This group is composed of members of evaluated units other
than the unit commanders, such as unit operations officer,
officers involved with subunits evaluated, and company
commanders. They also provided much information.
Given the sample identified, the field study, there-
fore, concentrated on those of rank from captain to colonel
in the military occupational fields of infantry, aviation
(fixed wing and helicopters), tanks, artillery, engineer,
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and air control. A total of 37 individuals were interviewed
The sample group is presented by rank and occupational field
below in Table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1
Rank /Occupational Field Sample Distribution
OCCUPATIONAL £ $ a. £





c k.Q> O v. C 2 QRANK\^ -=: u. I £ < ui < P
Colonel 3 1 4
Lt. Colonel 10 3 3 1 1 1 19
Major 3 4 3 1 11
Captain 2 1 3
TOTAL' 18 8 6 2 1 1
'
!7
These officers are i currently serving in billets throughout
wings, asthe Marine Corps, representing all divisions and
well as the 1st Marine Brigade in Hawaii. Other active duty
officers serving in billets at Headquarters Marine Corps,
Naval Postgraduate . School, and with the reserve establishment
were also interviewed.
2. Interview Techniaues
All those interviewed were asked a standard set of
open-ended questions [Ref. 45], These questions were pur-
posefully left brc ad and open-ended to solicit as many ideas
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and opinions as possible. Each interview was conducted
in person or by telephone by one of the researchers. All
interview results were recorded on an answer form and the
interviews were taped after the permission of the respondent
was given. When a respondent was uncertain or uncomfortable
in answering a question, he was asked to skip over it. How-
ever, no attempt was made to limit the respondent to any set
of prearranged answers. In all cases, where answer choices
were posed, an invitation for "other ideas or suggestions"
was made. As the interviews progressed, the questions were
refined to help the interviewee narrow in on the specific
area being researched.
3 . Questions Posed
The following set of questions was posed to all those
interviewed:
(1) When the computerized data results from a MCCRES are
provided to the evaluated unit, what uses are made
of that data?
(2) Do you feel that information/data provided to the
evaluated unit as the result of a MCCRES are satis-
factory for the purpose of initiating corrective
action that will improve combat readiness?
(3) Is the current procedure of providing the results as
a computer printout based on the evaluation of the
Sections, MPS, Tasks, and Requirements the most
effective format for displaying the results to the
evaluated unit commander?
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(4) Does the format lend itself"to a complete understanding
of how the unit performed compared with MCCRES
criteria?
(5) Do Marine Corps Directives provide sufficient guidance
for interpretation of results?
(6) Would it be helpful to know how your unit performed
on a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as compared with
other units? Example: Your infantry battalion scored
a 73% on the MPS, "Command and Control Operations."
This compares with a median of 68% for all other
infantry units and 71% for all units evaluated.
(7) What do you feel is the most effective forum for pro-
viding MCCRES results to the unit tested?
a. Oral debrief at end of exercise
b. Written debrief at end of exercise
c. Progressive oral debrief throughout the exercise
d. Combination of a-c above
e. Some other method than those suggested
(8) Who should be made aware of the MCCRES results?
a. Chain of command
b. Other like-units (infantry, air, artillery, etc.)
c. All Marine Corps units
4 . Background Visits
Additionally visits were made to Headquarters Marine
Corps (HQMC) , Readiness Branch, George Washington University
and to the Army's 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, California.
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Individuals interviewed during these visits provided many
valuable insights into the development and overseeing of
MCCRES , as well as a detailed understanding of how the Army
ARTEP system is employed. Several of the individuals inter-
viewed were involved in the early development of the MCCRES:
Professor W. H. Marlowe, George Washington University; Lt.
Colonel Paul Catalone, USMC, and Colonel M. P. Sullivan,
USMC (telephone interview) , and Lt . Colonel R. S. Gibson,
USMC (telephone interview)
.
E. CONTENT ANALYSIS/DATA REVIEW
Since the material/responses to the questions asked were
subjective in nature, content analysis was used to analyze
the results [Ref. 46].
1 . Content Analysis Defined
Berelson states: "Systematic content analysis
attempts to define casual descriptions of the content, so as
to show objectively the nature and relative strength of the
stimuli applied to the reader or listener" [Ref. 46: p. 14].
This procedure is employed by constructing an analy-
sis outline which, as described by Cartwright, embodies the
following general principles:
Step 1— specify data needs,
Step 2—map out plans for tabulation,
Step 3—map a skeleton of the outline,
Step 4— fill in categories for each variable,
Step 5—establish procedures for using the material,
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Step 6—try out the analysis outline and use procedure.
[Ref. 45: pp. 454-460]
The application of content analysis allows the re-
searcher to study the communications and focus on the inter-
action through messages which link communicating parties.
Not all significance can be extracted by inspection or mere
observation. The real purpose of any analysis is to illuminate
and make inferences about something that is not otherwise
apparent. Thus the process of content analysis is a process
like that used when applying the congruence definition of
evaluation which employs objectives and criteria in develop-
ing a measurement process which is both scientific and objec-
tive. The process is not, however, totally devoid of judgment
and does allow the researcher discretion in categorizing
results [Ref. 47]
.
2 . Analysis of Specific Responses to Questions
The purpose of content analysis is to provide some
means of quantifying subjective information. To accomplish
this rules must be established. The data contained in the
response to each of the eight questions was treated as a
separate unit and no attempt was made during the interview to
relate any answers from one question to that of another. This
procedure was used to solicit as much information possible
and not to limit any of the respondents in their comments.
Since each question stood alone and was relatively subjective
in nature, each question provided an opportunity for a response
to contain similar information as that given to different
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questions. Thus once a respondent began to provide informa-
tion to a question which was more appropriately categorized
as a response to a different question, the interviewer simply
recorded the information under the question currently being
asked. However as part of the analysis of the interviews,
responses to one question that were relevant to other ques-
tions were considered.
Each question had certain categories set up for the
responses and each response made was placed in one of these
categories. In order to generate useful information from
content analysis, the categories must be collectively exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive. For example:
Question #1--When the computerized data results from a MCCRES
are provided to the evaluated unit, what uses are made of
that data?
Responses to this question fell into three groupings:
"none"
"used for planning future training and resource allocation"
"historical reference only"
It should be understood that each MCCRES has many key
participants and each participant has a different involvement
in the evaluation. Some such as the unit commander and senior
evaluator are involved virtually in all aspects. Others such
as the operations officers and operations evaluators have a
more limited focus in their responsibilities. Thus a system
was developed to give varying weight to those who had differ-
ing levels of involvement with MCCRES
.
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High Intensity—those involved directly in one or more
MCCRES as unit commander, division or
wing MCCRES officer, senior evaluator.
Medium Intensity— those involved with less direct responsi-
bility for results: operations officers,
other evaluators , company commanders, etc.
Low Intensity—Employed in only one case where interviewee
was involved in a forerunner evaluation to
MCCRES
3 . Analysis of General Responses to Questions
To determine which question responses should be dis-
played for the reader, a 10% rule was formulated. If 10% or
more of the respondents to a question amplified their
specific answer with similar comments or suggestions, then
the comments were included. Thus, any of the general responses
included in the next chapter were mentioned by four or more
of those interviewed.
F. SUMMARY
In this chapter the research method is summarized. A
total of 37 Marine officers were interviewed. Although the
number is relatively small, it should be remembered that the
Marine Corps has three infantry divisions and three aircraft
wings on active duty. Therefore, the total population of
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those qualified to answer the questions is drawn from a
limited population of officers in the target group. It is
difficult to estimate the total number of officers that have
been involved in these primary capacities since the billet
holders rotate regularly; but it is safe to say that only a
few hundred officers have served as battalion/squadron com-
manders or senior evaluators of evaluated units. Since the
MCCRES is only required to be given every two years, the
sample used appears to be reasonable.
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VI. RESULTS
This chapter presents results obtained through the field
study. The specific and general responses to questions posed
were content analyzed. The basis for this type of analysis
is provided by Berelson [Ref . 4 6 J
.
Percentages derived from the content analysis are the
weighted averages of the points for each category as compared
with total points for each question. The responses are
weighted based upon the level of involvement of the respondent
in previous MCCRES's. In cases where some interviewees did
not answer a certain question, the percentage is based only
on the results of those who did answer. No attempt was made
to categorize reasons why those that failed to respond did so.
A. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
First Question: (1) When the computerized data results
from a MCCRES are provided to the evaluated unit, what uses
are made of that data?
Responses to this question were grouped into three cate-
gories—None, Used for planning, and Historical reference
only—and are shown in Table 6.1. The majority of the respondei:
(63.6%) said that the results of MCCRES were used for planning
future training or specifically for future resource allocation.
Second Question: (2) Do you feel that information/data
provided to the evaluated unit as a result of MCCRES is
82















































































































































satisfactory for the purpose of initiating corrective action
that will improve combat readiness?
The responses to this question are categorized as posi-
tive or negative and are shown in Table 6.2. The majority
of the respondents (81.3%) said that the information/data
provided from a MCCRES is satisfactory for initiating correc-
tive action that will improve combat readiness.
Third Question: (3) Is the current procedure of pro-
viding the results as a computer printout based on the results
of Sections , MPS, Tasks, and Requirements, the most effective
format for displaying the results to the evaluated unit?
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-
tive or negative. As shown by Table 6.3, 64.6% of the
respondents said that the current procedure of providing the
results as a computer printout was not the most effective
format for displaying the results to the evaluated unit.
Fourth Question: (4) Does the format lend itself to a
complete understanding of how the unit performed compared with
MCCRES criteria?
The response to this question was categorized as positive
or negative. As shown in Table 6.4, 55.6% of the respondents
said that the current format lends itself to a complete under-
standing of how the unit compared with MCCRES criteria.
Fifth Question: (5) Do Marine Corps Directives provide
sufficient guidance for interpretation of results?
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-
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respondents said that Marine Corps Directives provide suffi-
cient guidance for interpretation of results.
Sixth Question: (6) Would it be helpful to know how
your unit performed on a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as
compared with other units? Example: Your infantry battalion
scored a 73% on the MPS, "Command and Control Operations."
This compares with a median of 6 8% for all other infantry
units and 71% for all units tested.
The responses to this question were categorized as posi-
tive or negative. As shown by Table 6.6, 55.4% of the
respondents said that it would be helpful to know how their
unit performed on a Section/MPS/Task/Requirement as compared
with other units.
Seventh Question: (7) What do you feel is the most
effective forum for providing MCCRES results to the unit?
This question was evaluated based on selection of one of
five responses: oral debrief at end of exercise; written
debrief at end; progressive debrief; combination of above; or
other. As indicated in Table 6.7, all thirty-seven inter-
viewees responded to the question. Of the total, 91.5%
responded that a combination of oral and written debriefs
is the most effective forum for providing MCCRES results to
the unit evaluated.
Eighth Question: (8) Who should be made aware of MCCRES
results?
The question was evaluated based on selection of one of












































































































































'Mtten at end" (0) (2) (0) 2.1
'logressive' (6) (0) (0) 6.4
"ombmation
cabove"
13 (54) 15 (30) (0) 91.5
r\er (0) (0) (0)
DTAL: (60) (32) (0) (93) 100.0
timber Responding: 37 Response Rate: 100%
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units. As indicated in Table 6.8, 60.2% of the respondents
indicated that all units should be made aware of MCCRES
results
.
The responses to the questions are summarized for the
reader in Tables 6.9 and 6.10. Table 6.9 shows the distribu-
tion by rank of the specific responses to the eight questions.
Table 6.10 shows the distribution by community (ground/air)
.
A more detailed display of data by occupational specialty
was available to the researchers; however, to protect the
anonymity of the respondents only the general categorizations
of answers is displayed. In reviewing the data in Tables 6.9
and 6.10 there is no direct evidence of bias by any specific
rank or community. This same result was true when evaluating
the data by occupational specialty.
B. ANALYSIS OF GENERAL RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
The primary purpose of this research was to gain insight
and new ideas. To this end the respondents were specifically
asked to expand upon and explain their answers . Their
explanations resulted in the following information. The 10%
decision rule discussed above was used to determine which
information to present.
In response to Question One, which related to the uses
of the computerized results, the majority of the inter-
viewees said that the results from a MCCRES found their way
into unit training plans and schedules. One of the most
serious concerns brought out in response to this question con-
cerned timing [Ref. 22] of the evaluation. If the MCCRES is
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TABLE 6.8
Results of Question Eight
NSE INTENSITY PERCENTAGES
High Medium Low
# of Weighted # of Weighted # of Weighted
Respondents/Score Respondents/Score Respondents/Score
T of 5 (15) 6 (12) (0) 30.7
nand"
Mike 1 (2) 3 (6) (0) 9 1
iits" 11 (33) 10 (20) (0) 60.2
<L: (50) (38) (0) (88) 100.0
)er Responding: 36 Response Rate: 97.3%
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TABLE 6.9
Distribution by Rank of Responses to Questions
Question # Colonel Lt. Colonel
1. a. None 4
b. Planning 4 11
c. Historical 3
2. a. Positive 3 16
b. Negative 4
3. a. Positive 1 7
b. Negative 2 11
4. a. Positive 3 8
b. Negative 9
5. a. Positive 2 12
b. Negative 5
6. a. Positive 3 10




d. Combination 4 17
e. Other
8. a. Chain 1 7
b. Like 1





















































Distribution by Community of Responses to Questions
Question # Ground Aviation TOTAL
1. a. None 4 1 5
b. Planning 15 7 22
c. Historical 2 5 7
2. a. Positive 21 8 29
b. Negative 1 5 5
3. a. Positive 7 4 11
b. Negative 11 3 19
4. a. Positive 9 6 15
b. Negative 6 6 12
5. a. Positive 12 8 20
b. Negative 3 4 7
6. a. Positive 12 9 21
b. Negative 9 6 15
7. a. Oral
b. Written 1 1
c. Progressive 2 2
d. Combination 19 15 34
e. Other
8. a. Chain 9 2 11
b. Like 2 2 4
c. All 11 *0 21
KEY: Ground: Infantry, Tanks, Artillery, Engineer
Aviation: Fixed wing, Helicopter, Air Control
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given sixty days or more prior to deployment, then the unit
may experience substantial turnover of key personnel and
nullify the results of the MCCRES by changing key players.
The alternative to this presents a serious dilemma. If the
MCCRES is given too close to time of deployment, then little
time exists to correct all but the most glaring deficiencies.
Additionally, since no "real" second evaluation is made of
the shortcomings, the USMC may be deploying units who have
not in fact corrected shortcomings identified during MCCRES.
A second major problem identified by the respondents is
the timeliness with which the unit gets the actual MCCRES
report. Some organizations present at least a rough of the
printout to the unit at the time of the formal debrief, usually
12-24 hours after termination of the MCCRES. Other units do
not receive their formal printout until there is a complete
staffing by division/wing, regiment/group; and in at least two
cases the unit did not receive their formal feedback until
they were on their deployment. One unit did not see their
printout at all after the MCCRES. (The last comment is pro-
vided as an exception to the 10% rule because of the serious-
ness of this situation.)
Responses to Question Two indicated that the current
MCCRES gives sufficient information to improve combat readi-
ness. In the case of the rotory wing MCCRES, three of the six
rotory wing respondents indicated that more weight was needed
on flying skills than is currently given by the MPS in Volume
III. Generally the responses from the rotory wing community
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indicated too much emphasis is given to non-flight require-
ments and too little to flight skills. In addition responses
from the fixed-wing community indicated that technology is
changing more rapidly than the MCCRES . With the implementa-
tion of the FA-18 aircraft and changes to other aircraft, the
MCCRES evaluation needs to be changed to be current and realis-
tic. In other words the aircraft can do a lot more than
MCCRES requires. Discussions with the Readiness Branch indi-
cate they are well aware of the problems caused by changing
technology in the FA-18 and other new aircraft, and are
presently improving the MCCRES requirements to test the air-
craft at limits that more closely approximate its actual
capabilities rather than against the less demanding F-4
Requirements
.
A total of 13 respondents commented that MCCRES results
are only as credible as the evaluators . The absence of
standardization of evaluators and evaluator training, as well
as the variances in how organizations pick evaluators had a
great impact on the value perceptions and the worth of the
MCCRES as a measure of the unit's readiness. This was ex-
pressed by six of the fifteen officers of the aviation com-
munity. Forty percent of the respondents submitted an
unsolicited comment on the quality of the evaluators. If
the evaluator is not regarded as highly qualified by his peers,
then the evaluation is regarded with little weight. The
question of evaluator selection and bias is discussed in
more depth by Conatser [Ref. 6] and Wheeler [Ref. 5],
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A final problem cited dealt with the MCCRES concept of com-
paring unit performance with published combat doctrine. Doc-
trine as codified in written manuals may be outdated. If so,
the USMC is evaluating units by comparing their performance to
standards which would not be employed on the modern battlefield
An example of this cited by four infantry commanders is "maneuv
warfare." Maneuver warfare is widely accepted by Western mili-
tary analysts as the most promising way to fight and win any
future war against Soviet tactics. However, maneuver warfare
is not written into current Marine Corps doctrinal publications
This shortfall points out the need for distribution of MCCRES
results to all training and doctrine commands to ensure they
are aware of the strengths and shortfalls that units/individual
display on MCCRES.
The most common response to Question Three, which related
to effectiveness of the display of the results, was negative.
A percentage of 64.6% of the respondents said that they did
not feel the computerized printout is the best way to dis-
play MCCRES results. Nineteen of thirty respondents indicated
more subjective data was needed to fully understand the
units' evaluations and to be able to take corrective actions.
The computer printout provides a "Yes/No" evaluation, but it
fails to provide the "why" and "what" [Ref. 37] . More details
are needed to describe specific reasons for "No" marks and
recommendations are necessary to help the unit find ways to
improve. All those responding negatively (19 of the 30
respondents) indicated it was much more valuable to spell out
the details of a shortfall and to suggest corrective action,
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than to simply provide a "Yes/No" on an evaluation sheet. One
wing MCCRES officer accomplishes this by writing all comments
directly on the MCCRES printout before it is provided to the
unit. The wing MCCRES officer said this facilitates a much
more complete understanding of problem areas. The general
consensus of the 30 respondents to this question was that the
subjective, explanatory information is by far the most valua-
ble to the evaluated unit and the percentile scores on the
printout are probably of greater value to higher level head-
quarters for use in planning future training.
In response to Question Four, which related to the under-
standability of the results, 15 of the 27 respondents or
55.6% agreed that the current format is not difficult to
understand. In general those who indicated a willingness to
reference the directives and compare the printout to the appro-
priate Volume were satisfied with the explanations provided
therein. Those who said the current format is difficult to
understand (12 of the 27 or 44.4%) did so based on a criterion
of the inconvenience of the system, that is requiring both
the printout and the Volume. The combined use of the printout
and Volume requires a good bit of tedious research to find the
details of each MPS/Task/Requirement . The recent addition of
a description of each MPS/Task/Requirement on the MCCRES
printout should help reduce this problem. On the other hand,
the brief description may cause even less referencing of the
source document to obtain complete details. One suggestion
was that key players from the unit to be evaluated should be
given detailed classes and instructions on the MPS several
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weeks prior to a scheduled MCCRES . This has recently been
started in one wing and the results are excellent. This
contention was supported by both squadron commanders ques-
tioned as well as by those in the Readiness Branch at Head-
quarters Marine Corps. Just as there is a need to educate
evaluators , there is also a need to educate those to be
evaluated [Refs. 5,27,28],
An added point made by five unit commanders was that the
results must get out to all those concerned. If the response
to an evaluation is delayed or the results simply become his-
torical record, those who need to know at company, platoon,
and squad level are never made aware of the results. Emphasis
is needed on informing all participants down to the individual
Marine of the results of MCCRES [Refs. 16,39]. MCCRES re-
sults should be distributed to all detachments to ensure
they know how their performance was evaluated.
Responses to Question Five indicated that the orders
generally seem well written and easy to interpret. The same
suggestion for education made on Question Four applies here.
That is, any instruction given to key unit players will result
in better overall understanding of MCCRES and allows the unit
to better use the results.
Several specific shortcomings in MCCRES were also noted
in response to Question Five. Those relating to aviation were
addressed under Question Two. One infantry division has
found some serious shortcomings, specifically in the failure
to provide for intelligence gathering, fire support coordinatic
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and allocation of tasks from higher headquarters. These three
areas all apply to specific MPS * s that need expansion or
improvement.
Question Six, which related to unit results comparisons,
by far evoked the most emotional and intense responses. Any
time a comparative index is proposed it has the potential for
both good and bad results depending on its use. Of 37 indi-
viduals interviewed, 55.4% favored some sort of use of com-
parative scores. Those opposed tended to do so based on the
view that any comparison of scores provided a potential for use
as a report card to compare units and specifically unit com-
manders. The primary objections to the use of comparative
scores was based on the lack of overall standardization within
MCCRES , especially the differences in evaluators , scenarios,
terrain, and weather conditions.
Those who favored comparative scoring did so for various
reasons. Four respondents thought comparative scoring had value,
but only for higher headquarters, training, and doctrine commands.
Seven others thought comparative scoring had value if shown to
the unit in complete privacy. A final segment of ten respondents
indicated that the comparative scoring had potential to create
more unit competition. Thus, overall, 10 out of the 37 respon-
dents supported any sort of mass publication of comparative scores
The results to Question Seven provided evidence that
feedback must be provided in various forms throughout the
exercise to be most effective. As seen in response to Question
Three, 64.6% wanted more subjective feedback. In Question
101
Seven that was reaffirmed. The respondents said that by far th
most valuable feedback was obtained from verbal, subjective
critiques given immediately after an event has taken place.
A total of 91.5% of the respondents indicated a combination
of debriefs and written results is most desirable. The written
results should not only include the objective numerical re-
sults of "Yes/No" markings, but also explanation of all the
"No/N.A." markings.
Question Eight, which dealt with the distribution of MCCRES
results, was most often answered with "all units," 60.2% of
the time. The specific point made here was that the chain of
command has an obvious need to know the results. All units
could benefit from a generic trend analysis report. Trend
analysis would provide a cross pollination of critical infor-
mation throughout the Marine Corps and assist those involved
in developing training and doctrine. Those favoring "all
units" or "other like units" comprised a total percentage of
69.3%, provided a favorable response to the suggestion of re-
ceiving a generic trend analysis at regular intervals from
the MCCRES Data Bank. The fact that no respondent provided any
objection to this idea is indicative of its positive value.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter presented the results of the field study.
As can be seen in the next chapter the analysis of specific
and general responses to the eight questions provided answers
to the research questions posed by this study. In addition
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a number of important unsolicited comments, outside the scope
of this study, were also obtained. These comments are pre-
sented in Appendix B.
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VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. ANSWERS TO PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The results of the research have provided answers to
questions posed at the beginning of this project. The three
primary research questions were:
(1) After MCCRES , what information should be fed back
to the evaluated unit commander?
(2) In what form should the evaluation feedback be?
(3) What channel (s) should be used to provide the
feedback to the evaluated unit?
A comprehensive feedback model is presented which incorporates
the results for the three questions.
It was evident throughout this study that the unit com-
mander faces many constraints: training time, material,
equipment, logistics, and personnel. The information from
MCCRES should be provided in such a way as to allow for
better allocation of these scarce resources to the unit.
As discussed in Chapter II, the overall goal of the MCCRES
is not only to provide a measure of unit readiness, but to
provide effective feedback to the organization to enhance the
opportunities to improve readiness by applying resources to
areas identified as deficient by MCCRES. The discussion of
management control and evaluation, as presented in Chapter
III, provides a rich background for understanding how to
perform the MCCRES evaluation and how to effectively use the
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results of an evaluation. In models of evaluation, informa-
tion and feedback play an important role in both performing
and using the results of an evaluation. In general the models
of evaluation have common desirable characteristics such as:
brevity, clarity, timeliness, interim products and reports,
and responsiveness of feedback [Ref . 35] .
Additionally, characteristics of the organizational con-
trol system [Ref. 44] such as goals, standards, measurement
system, evaluation and reward system as well as the feedback
loop play an equally important role in the evaluation models
[Refs. 32,34,35,38, and 40].
Based upon these findings and the results of a field
study, a model for MCCRES feedback was developed. The model
is presented in Figure 7.1. Each of the eight major elements












Figure 7.1 Mode! of MCCRES Feedback to an Evaluated Unit
1Q5
1. Pre-MCCRES Briefing
A detailed orientation several weeks prior to MCCRES
to provide a firm foundation for all key personnel. The
orientation should provide an explanation of appropriate
Volumes of MCO 3501.2. Explanation of the details of each
MPS and procedures for the evaluator allows the unit to
maximize the potential from the MCCRES feedback [Ref . 37]
.
2. Real Time Feedback
Regular verbal feedback throughout the exercise by
evaluators at each level. At any logical break in the
scenario detailed evaluations of the most recent events
should be provided by the evaluators. This provides data




The Evaluator Worksheets should be provided directly
to the evaluated element shortly after conclusion of the
exercise. This provides an interim evaluation report and
allows for maximum feedback to the specific element evaluated.
It would be especially valuable to subunits and attachments
who often receive only minimal feedback under current proce-
dures [Ref. 3 7] .
4 . Two-way Debrief
At the end of exercise, twelve to twenty-four hours
after the end of the formal MCCRES, a detailed debrief should
be held for evaluators and key players from the unit evaluated.
Opportunities should be given for two-way discussion to resolve
any confusion or disagreement particularly regarding subjective
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areas. The individuals from the evaluated unit should leave
with not only a clear understanding of the deficiencies,
but also with a clear understanding of what caused the "No"
evaluations and suggestions for improvement [Ref. 35]. Since
the commander of the unit evaluated is responsible for the
employment of the feedback, he should have the flexibility
to tailor the debrief to his leadership style. The commander
may desire to have only a few selected evaluators and officers
present or the unit commander may desire all evaluators and
unit officers to be present.
5. Computerized MCCRES Printout
The computerized MCCRES printout with percentile
scores and detailed amplifying remarks should be provided to
the unit in a timely manner [Ref. 35]. It does a unit little
good to get the detailed results when there is no time to
correct deficiencies. What is timely can vary depending on
deployment schedules, but getting a copy of the results in
the hands of the evaluated unit so that action can be taken
is essential. It is inexcusable and unprofessional to allow
staffing to delay this critical information. Delays also
put the unit further away from the MCCRES and it tends to




The data needed to compare units within a division or
wing is currently available with limited research within the
division or wing files. Additionally most division or wing
headquarters are well aware of how their scores compare with
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other like units. Usage of the general MCCRES data bank to
provide comparative scores, medians, and standard deviations
should be provided to major headquarters staff, training, and
doctrine commands for the limited purpose of planning future
resource allocation and to develop training doctrine. These
comparative results should be limited to Section/MPS/Task
scores and should not include any sort of comparative final
score for the units as a whole. Providing any sort of overall
scores that could be used to compare individual units tested
could well have a negative, impact because of the many variations
in evaluation conditions that exist. It is further recommended
that these comparative results be directed only at division/
wing level or higher commands to reduce the chance of any
type of unit comparisons.
An example of comparative percentile results that could
be provided to division/wing level for use in planning future
training is presented in Figure 7.2.
PAST SIX MONTH MCCRES RESULTS
Division/ Overall
Wing Marine Oorps
Section 2.0 Operations Performed 93.2% 91.1%
MPS 2.A Actions by Marines 97.8% 98.4%
Task 2.A.1 Discipline 86.4% 90.2%




Currently no follow up evaluation is made to confirm
that the deficiencies have been corrected. Some type of
final check is needed. This check would best be accomplished
with little formality. Since the unit commander has the
responsibility for application of MCCRES feedback to improve
unit readiness, it is best left to the unit commander to do
the final check which certifies that deficiencies have been
corrected. Resource reallocation from outside the evaluated
unit likewise should be certified at the appropriate level.
The key issue here is that the unit must be deployed at the
highest level of combat readiness and verification of correc-
tion of MCCRES deficiencies at least on an informal basis is
essential. This follow-up should be made as simply as possi-
ble. The unit commander can appropriately perform this
certification based on his own experience and judgment. A
formal follow-up inspection is neither necessary nor desirable
8 Trend Analysis
To gain a higher level of across-the-board readiness,
a trend analysis would be of value to all units. The MCCRES
data base represents a resource that could be used to keep
the Marine Corps informed of its overall strengths and
weaknesses. Special emphasis should be made on getting these
results to training and doctrine organizations throughout
the Marine Corps.
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B. ANSWERS TO SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The results of the research provided answers to the
secondary research questions posed at the beginning of the
project. The three secondary research questions were:
(1) What is the validity of comparing MCCRES results
given under different conditions?
(2) Does MCCRES contribute to effective training?
(3) Is there available time and follow up to ensure
correction of deficiencies identified during MCCRES?
A first response to the question of the validity of com-
paring MCCRES results given under differing conditions might
be to say that such comparisons can only be made if complete
standardization is achieved. Although complete standardiza-
tion for purposes of evaluation may seem to be desirable, this
may not be feasible. Since various Marine Corps units (east
coast, west coast, overseas) are preparing for different mis-
sions, it is desirable to simulate their expected combat
employment through the use of different scenarios, terrain,
and even MPS * s . Additionally the Marine Corps has other exer-
cises, such as the Combined Arms Exercise (CAX's), which are
used to evaluate under standard scenario, terrain, and evalua-
tors, but they have a more limited purpose than MCCRES.
Additionally, because of the broader purposes of MCCRES,
complete standardization is probably not desirable. For its
intended purpose, MCCRES appears to provide a relatively high
degree of objectivity when compared with other military systems,
such as the performance evaluation system used for the
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promotions of Marine Officers, and the results are likely to
be useful, at least for generic comparisons, and to identify
trends
.
In response to the question of MCCRES * s contribution to
effective training, it is evident from the data gathered for
this study that MCCRES has the potential to, and currently
does, improve unit training. Many units train to MCCRES
standards and go so far as to use actual MCCRES Section/MPS/
Task/Requirements to structure their unit training. There-
fore as the Individual Training Standards (ITS) are developed
for all units, it is essential that they be closely compared
with MCCRES standards so that the training and evaluation
development move in the same direction [Refs. 5,30,31].
The third question, time availability to correct MCCRES
deficiencies, has previously been discussed. No doubt more
time would allow for more training in deficient areas.
However, the question of follow up is also critical. As
stated above, at least an informal re-validation of deficient
areas is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the MCCRES.
C. SUMMARY
This research has provided detailed answers to the ques-
tions posed at the beginning of the study. The feedback to
the unit is the key element to making the MCCRES of value to
the unit evaluated. The purpose of MCCRES is to provide
timely and accurate evaluation of the force readiness. Key
to improving readiness is identification of strengths and
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weaknesses, and providing timely and thorough feedback to the
evaluated unit and its chain of command. The more timely
and thorough the feedback, the higher the likelihood of im-
proved future readiness. The MCCRES is currently viewed as
a sound, valuable evaluation system. However, as this study
has demonstrated, the feedback to the units can be improved.
D. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS
The feedback model developed and displayed as Figure 7.1
should be incorporated as the minimum acceptable procedure
for providing feedback from any MCCRES. To accomplish this
the eight steps in the feedback model should be followed
during each evaluation. The following information should
be routinely provided as feedback.
Pre-MCCRES Briefing—to key MCCRES players from the
evaluated unit
Real Time Feedback—distributed to all those evaluated
Two-way Debrief at end of exercise—tailored to needs of




provided in a timely manner
to allow new resource allocation prior to deployment
Comparative Percentile Results—to help direct unit train-
ing and for incorporation by individual training and
doctrine commands
Follow-up Report—done informally by unit commander to
ensure closure of feedback loop by correction of
identified deficiencies
Trend Analysis—to support future training as well as
changes in doctrine.
Implementation of these recommendations would suit the
stated needs of fleet units as well as serve the intended
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MCCRES purpose of providing an evaluation of unit readiness
to higher headquarters.
E. SUMMARY OF STUDY
The purpose of this study was to determine the most
appropriate and effective manner in which to provide feedback
to the unit commander from a MCCRES. To this end research was
conducted into the areas of management control and evaluation
theory. Additionally , specif ic research was conducted in
the area of existing systems which measure or evaluate
readiness
.
The study was approached from a multi-disciplinary back-
ground with a detailed emphasis on the economic question of
how better distribution could be made of the scarce resources
of manpower, equipment, and training time based on the re-
sults of MCCRES. To answer the questions a detailed field
study was conducted in which interviews were completed with
37 Marine officers of rank from Captain to Colonel who have
had involvement with MCCRES as key billet holders. Addi-
tionally much of the original documentation that laid the
groundwork for the development of MCCRES was reviewed along
with interviews and visits with some of the original developers
of the system.
The results of the study are displayed as an eight step
feedback model which is based on previous research in the
fields of management control and evaluation, as well as the
results of the field study. These results are communicated
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to the reader as a model in Figure 7.1 which is comprised of
the following elements:
(1) Pre-MCCRES Briefing
(2) Real Time Feedback
(3) Evaluator worksheets
(4) Two-way Debrief at the end of Exercise
(5) Computerized MCCRES Printout
(6) Comparative Percentile Results
(7) Follow-up Report
(8) Trend Analysis
The incorporation of this model as standard MCCRES
feedback procedure will significantly enhance the value
of the results to the evaluated unit and will improve the










































































































































































































SUMMARY OF UNSOLICITED COMMENTS
Because of the technique employed of encouraging expan-
sion and discussion on each question, numerous ideas were
brought forth. Although these were not specifically evaluated,
they are of potential importance and should be at least con-
sidered by anyone interested in MCCRES . The comments identi-
fied herein were selected based on their logic and potential
impact on MCCRES. No attempt was made to support or disprove
these remarks; such an analysis is, therefore, left for
future research.
A. PRESENT APPROACH TO MCCRES
Few if any units fail. MCCRES credibility is in serious
doubt to several respondents because all units seem to pass
with very similar overall scores. As a result of this, the
final MCCRES grade is not very meaningful, especially without
other grades with which to compare the score. As a result
of this, two of those questioned indicated they saw no value
at all to overall unit grade. They stated consideration should
be given to doing away with the unit grade and just providing
comparative-trend analysis scores on a generic basis. This
would do away with the informal comparison of scores that now
takes place and provide better support of the intended purpose
of not using the MCCRES to compare the overall readiness of
units evaluated.
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B. TWO MCCRES ' S
The general feeling among all the respondents is that
MCCRES is a superb opportunity for training with more assets
allocated to the evaluated unit than for most other exercises
Some suggest a MCCRES should be conducted at both the be-
ginning and end of a training cycle; to evaluate improvements
and to measure the unit against itself. This would allow
evaluators to be more critical, because the unit would iden-
tify strengths and weaknesses early and adjust training
objectives accordingly. Although it is a costly suggestion,
it has potential to further improve readiness.
C. ANALYZE INDIVIDUALS
The Command needs to know not only strengths and weak-
nesses of unit/subunit performance, but the evaluated unit
commander also needs an independent assessment of individual
leadership strengths and weaknesses. Providing MPS ' s that
require individual evaluation of leaders at all levels would
assist the unit commanders to reinforce his own observations
and to be more aware of where he needs to place emphasis.
D. TACTICAL STERILITY
MCCRES rewards these who follow doctrine explicitly and
avoid innovation. In maneuver warfare innovation and flexi-
bility are the key to success. Yet MCCRES measures perform-
ance by comparison with standard doctrine. Problems here
arise not out of the MCCRES procedure, but the fact that much
of the doctrine upon which MCCRES is based rapidly is being
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outdated. To have an effective/believable evaluation, the
whole cycle of doctrine and inclusion of new doctrines in
MCCRES must be maintained. The general thought is MCCRES
rewards those who "play the game" and may punish those who
are "ahead of written doctrine." Some respondents said
sufficient strides have been made to overcome this in certain
situations, but others said this remains a widespread system
problem.
E. LEVEL OF APPLICATION
Although Reference 1 states that the Fleet Marine Force
Commanding General is responsible for application of MCCRES,
the authority is delegated to various levels. Some of the
control is held tightly at the division/wing levels; others
delegate the actual evaluation to regiment/group level.
These differing procedures greatly change the standardization
of evaluation and reduce the pool of potential evaluators
.
F. GROUPING AND TIMING FOR EVALUATION
Most every MCCRES has a different grouping of unit types.
For instance some organizations evaluate battalion-landing
team units with the attached artillery, engineers, tanks.
Others evaluate only the infantry battalion; while some organi-
zations use the MCCRES to evaluate artillery as battalions
and others do not. The Marine Corps standard is that each
unit be evaluated using MCCRES every two years, to ensure
that all units in fact are evaluated. A detailed scheduling
system should be incorporated to ensure that no units are
missed in the process.
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